Five Stages to Peace

After 40 days of civil war in Lebanon, the U.N.'s Dag Hammarskjold led a task force of peace, hoping to avert destruction of the tiny country and disaster in the Middle East. In a stagnant and ugly situation, he represented a last chance.

His start was auspicious. He arrived in Beirut only four days after 50 had died in the capital's bloodiest battle, and in the midst of tension so great that the U.S. embassy had told all 5,000 American residents of Lebanon to stay indoors for the day. But Dag Hammarskjold, imperturbable professional bird of good omen, brought the country--at least temporarily--its quietest days since the revolt began. He moved swiftly into headquarters in the Biarritz Hotel commanding a magnificent view of the Mediterranean, and began conferences with the U.N. observers who had already arrived under the Security Council directive to "ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese borders."

Late that morning the Secretary-General visited President Camille Chamoun for 45 minutes, and silently took notes on what the President had to say. Reportedly, Chamoun wanted a U.N. force of several thousand to seal off his Syrian border against further United Arab Republic infiltration. Hammarskjold gave Chamoun no answer and would not even talk to rebel leaders. Instead, he stuck rigidly to his mandate to set up a group to watch the border.

His chief observer, New Zealand's Lieut. Colonel Maurice Brown, promised to have the 100 spotters that Hammarskjold wanted (from nine countries) at work by week's end. From four outposts scattered throughout Lebanon, Brown sent them out in pairs of white U.N. jeeps to "see and hear." Later he hopes to add four light planes and two helicopters (offered by the U.S.) for his spotters. When Lebanese officials complained that such small, unarmed patrols could not stop infiltrators, Ecuador's ex-President Galo Plaza Lasso, one of the U.N.'s three supervisory commissioners, explained: "Our way is the moral way. We hope to stop the infiltration by bringing it to international attention."

The Christian Coast. But the deeper question was whether stopping the infiltration would stop the fighting. The rebels in Lebanon already had plenty of arms and plenty of men. They hold whole chunks of Lebanese territory, particularly around the borders. And if the end did not come soon (or evaporate, as Middle East crises sometimes do), the confused and intermittent struggle for Lebanon might become a crucial battle for the whole Middle East. Behind the Lebanese revolt, whether he started it or not, stood Nasser, his propaganda stirred up hatred* and his agents smuggled arms. Back of the Lebanese government, which was the first in the Arab world to adhere to the Eisenhower Doctrine, stood the U.S.

What was the shooting about? Lebanon's Moslem rebels, whose leaders shouted at the outset that their aim was simply to keep President Chamoun from changing the constitution and running for a second term, fought right on after the government pledged that Chamoun would step down when his six-year term ended in September. Chamoun, confident that he could always count on U.S. aid, refused to compromise further.

Though he represents the Christian half of the nation, which has held the balance of power on the Levantine coast since the days of the Crusaders, Camille Chamoun cannot appeal for a defiance of Moslems in a way that a homogeneous state such as Israel can. Chamoun stands instead for that Lebanese tradition that turned its divisions to another sort of strength, the tradition of religious tolerance and political balance that built up commercial prosperity and cultural progress for Christians and Moslems alike. Chosen President of his country by the tradition that assigns that office to a Roman Catholic of the Maronite sect, Chamoun had to beware of turning Lebanon's internal struggle into a religious war between Christians and Moslem Arabs bent on making Lebanon a Moslem-run country tied to Egypt's Nasser.

Quiet Diplomacy. It might soon become that. In these straits there were five courses of action open, each one progressively more unattractive.

The first was to settle the affair among the Lebanese themselves. Last week, pressed to replace his ineffectual army commander with one who would turn all guns on the rebels, President Chamoun argued that for Lebanon's brigade-size army to take the offensive would be to risk a defeat "which would be fatal to the morale of the army and the people."

The second was, to back Hammarskjold's line-drawing plan. This way offered a chance to stop Nasser without causing public pain to Nasser's pathologically thin-skinned pride and his prestige as the unstoppable leader of Arab nationalism.

The third course, if a hundred men crisscrossing the Lebanese mountains in white jeeps should not hold back Nasser's ambitions, would be to create a U.N. force with troops from such middle-size powers as India, Brazil, Norway, large enough to seal off Lebanon's borders. Nasser has been happy enough to accept just such a U.N. Emergency Force to seal his Palestine frontier since the Israeli withdrawal of 1957. Such U.N. assistance might stabilize the little country long enough for the rebels to stop fighting, for Chamoun to serve out his lawful term, and for a new President to take office unburdened by the legacy of hate and dedicated to restoring Lebanon to its old place at the middle of the Middle East.

The fourth course might be forced on the Lebanese if all U.N. efforts should fail. Though President Chamoun last week described his policy as "neutrality among the Arab states and friendship for the West," his regime might appeal for help to those Arab neighbors aligned with the West and in opposition to Nasser: the Arab Union of Iraq and Jordan. Iraq's troops would have to be flown in, and there is question whether they would relish fighting other Arabs.

The fifth course, and one that a modern Arab nation would probably take only to save itself from destruction: ask the U.S. and Britain to send in troops.

The Last Resort. Neither the U.S. nor Britain was keen to move in, but it was a last resort that neither Lebanon nor its friends could overlook last week. If Lebanon's pro-West regime were to fall, the whole U.S. position in the Middle East would be jeopardized. Last week Secretary Dulles paid a rare visit to the Pentagon to discuss ways and means of moving U.S. forces into Lebanon if requested. Later he told his press conference that there were "other contingencies" for U.S. action in the Lebanese crisis than through the U.N.

The Sixth Fleet, with 3,000 combat equipped Marines aboard, canceled an Istanbul visit to remain at sea in the Eastern Mediterranean; the British increased their troop strength in Cyprus to 37,000, considerably more than was needed for quelling Nicosia rioters. The Soviet press, denouncing "imperialist war plans against Lebanon," hinted at sending Russian "volunteers" to help the rebels. Amid these rumblings, Peacemaker Dag Hammarskjold flew on to Cairo this week to explain the advantages of the thin line he had drawn across the Lebanese side of Nasser's Syrian frontier.

*Sample wild accusation by the U.A.R.'s clandestine "Radio Free Lebanon": that Lebanese Foreign Minister and U.N. Delegate Charles Malik was actually Agent No. 6 in the British Secret Service, and had been paid $200,000 by the British.

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