An Act in Time

The air in Washington on Monday morning hung oppressive and muggy. At 8 o'clock the rain began to fall in a dismal drizzle, slicking the streets, washing the stone and concrete faces of the capital. The raindrops beaded the row of semicircular windows off the White House south lawn and snaked down the panes. Behind the windows, seated in his red leather chair, President Eisenhower pored grimly over the news dispatches and diplomatic intelligence that told of Iraq's fall.

The reports told everything the U.S. knew to that moment about the coup, and estimated what its effects might be on such Western allies as Jordan and Lebanon. Since the predawn alarm was sounded by the duty officers at the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon, staffers had been at work getting the material ready for presidential decision. In the silence of his White House office, the President of the U.S. knew in Monday's early hours that he must act in time.

Crisp & Quick. Already programed for that morning was a 9:45 meeting of the National Security Council, which was scheduled to deal with civilian defense problems. Ike decided not to change the agenda but to cut the meeting short. At 10:30, during the meeting in the Cabinet room, an aide handed the President a note saying that Dulles had arrived and was waiting in the President's office. The President adjourned the meeting and walked back to his office with Vice President Richard Nixon, Treasury Secretary Robert Anderson, Central Intelligence Agency Director Allen Dulles, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Nathan Twining, and a squad of other experts.

Foster Dulles had in his hand a wire from U.S. Ambassador Robert McClintock in Beirut, advising that Lebanon's President Chamoun was urgently requesting U.S. troops. The Dulles brothers outlined the problem: unless the U.S. acted soon, Lebanon would collapse, and quickly. Jordan would follow soon. The U.S. was morally bound to go to the aid of Lebanon, and there was just the faintest chance that a quick movement of troops to Lebanon might bolster whatever resistance there might still be in Iraq. The President's advisers agreed that U.S. intervention would surely reap hot Russian and Nasserian denunciation, but not, in all probability, armed opposition. Crisply and quickly, General Twining laid out a precise account of how U.S. forces could be deployed to help Lebanon (see box).

Easy in his chair, the President calmly listened, asked questions, grunted approval. Said one member of the meeting: "It was good to see him so relaxed. There was no hurling of thunderbolts, nor was there uncertainty. I realized as never before why a President is so important--to be able to give to others, at such a time, an impression of unruffled assurance and confidence. This was Eisenhower at his best."

The Immediacy. Nearly two hours later, the meeting broke up. Tentatively, the President had made a twofold decision: the U.S. would 1) send an armed vanguard to Lebanon, and 2) lay the problem before an emergency session of the U.N. Security Council. The President himself said he would notify Canada's Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and Britain's Macmillan of the decision by telephone. Dulles agreed to have U.S. embassies pass the word to other NATO and Western powers (with some concern that the sievelike leaks among France's civil servants might somehow telegraph the U.S. punch too early). Ike turned to his legislative aide, Major General Wilton "Jerry" Persons, and said: "Jerry, how soon do you think you can get the legislative leaders here?"

Persons rounded up 22 high-ranking Republicans and Democrats from Congress by 2:30. The President greeted them individually as they filed into his office and took chairs in a semicircle around his desk. "Gentlemen," said Ike, "I have asked you to come down here as I do on all matters of great urgency involving international developments." Then, in general terms, he outlined the Lebanon and Iraq situations. "I have discussed this with my people here and in the National Security Council," he added, "but I must emphasize that no decision has been made. I want to give you the pros and cons. But I must also emphasize that a decision must be made in the immediate future--within the next hour or two." Then he said: "You see you are not being called in here after a decision has been reached."

The Implication. Again, CIA's Allen Dulles and State's Foster Dulles briefed the meeting. If the U.S. does not act on Chamoun's request now, said the Secretary of State, "our prestige is gone; nobody will take our word again--ever. If we get there first, there might not be Communist intervention." If the U.S. refused to take a stand now, he added, the free world would stand to lose not only the Middle East and nearly three-fourths of the free world's oil reserve, but Africa and even non-Communist Asia.

The Republicans agreed, but California's Bill Knowland and New Hampshire's Styles Bridges noted wryly that the U.S. would probably not be in this predicament had it let Britain, France and Israel finish off Nasser at the time of Suez. Montana's Mike Mansfield, acting Senate Democratic leader, and Arkansas' Bill Fulbright wanted the U.S. to act through the U.N. in some sort of joint effort. Finally, House Speaker Sam Rayburn spoke up: "Mr. President, what I want to know is, do you realize the implications of the step you are taking? I want to ask, if you go this far, are you prepared to go all the way?"

"Of course I realize the potentialities," the President replied. "I believe if we take early action we are much less liable to be involved in a major way than if we hesitate now and become involved later. I realize the potentialities, and naturally, when I go into this thing I am prepared to go through with it." General Twining, speaking for the Joint Chiefs, supplied the clincher: The Pentagon leaders, he said, "are unanimous in their opinion that this is the only sound course of action."

It was 4:43 p.m. The congressional leaders had left. In the President's office, amid the collection of empty chairs, Ike's aides, struck with the somberness that envelops decisions of moment, stood silent.

The President of the U.S. turned to General Twining. "All right," said he. "We'll send 'em in. Nate, put it into operation."

The Symbol. The next job was to make his decision known to the nation. Next morning, as U.S. marines were landing on the beaches of Lebanon, Ike authorized Press Secretary James Hagerty to tell newsmen, followed this up with a message to Congress and a filmed address that was telecast and broadcast across the country. "It is recognized that the step now being taken may have serious consequences," he told Congress bluntly. "I have, however, come to the considered and sober conclusion that despite the risks involved this action is required to support the principles of justice and international law upon which peace and a stable international order depend."

At week's end Ike broadcast one more message, this time to the U.S. forces staked down at Lebanon:

"This is the President . . . You are in Lebanon because the U.S. has responded to an urgent request from Lebanon . . . a free nation . . . While you are in Lebanon, each of you is a personal representative of the U.S.--a symbol of the national aspirations for freedom for all people ... It will be a trying time for all of you. I know that. But I also know that you are American servicemen, trained to do your duty to your country. Through me, our people here at home thank you. God bless you all!"

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