The Generals Take Over

"My authority is revolution," proclaimed Pakistan's President Iskander Mirza, as he coolly scrapped his country's constitution and Parliament--and still another of the struggling new Afro-Asian states passed under army dictatorship.

All across the Middle East and Southeast Asia the strongmen have been taking over: in Burma, where the army moved in bloodlessly last month; in Thailand, where the army boss overthrew the regime last fall; in Iraq, where an army revolt toppled King Feisal's regime last July. In the once stable and prosperous little republic of Lebanon, Parliament elected Army Chief Fuad Chehab President last month in hopes of saving the country from ruin by civil war. And last week the region's most redoubtable strongman, Egypt's Nasser, was busily fastening his grip on the last remaining outposts of civilian rule in his restive Syrian province.

A Pointer. In a broad sweep of land extending from the Mediterranean to the China Sea, nations under army rule formed a solid wedge interrupted only by Israel, Iran (where the present Shah's father came to power by a military coup) and India. In India itself, addressing a meeting of the ruling Congress Party, Home Minister G. B. Pant bluntly labeled the events across the border in Pakistan and Burma "a pointer to us." Added the Indian Express: "First Iraq, then Burma and now Pakistan. It is a pattern set by Egypt's Nasser--the same sickening sequence of corrupt rulers, interminable political instability, national humiliation and deteriorating living standards undermining the people's faith in their politicians and democracy."

All but one (Thailand) of the army-ruled nations east of Suez had been freed from British or French overlordship within the past 15 years. Some of these nations had been made a present of their liberty; others had to struggle for it. In either case, the army seemed the most stable and uncorrupted institution in the country. Its leaders had been trained by the British or French, had been schooled in Western ideas, had developed an esprit de corps.

They could see the wasting effects of poverty, illiteracy and chaos in their people. They had a contempt for the intrigues and corruption of politicians who aped Western democratic practices but had little understanding of the democratic notions of restraint, tolerance and justice.

Not all politicians were corrupt, by any means, but the best were often helpless. Soldiers were dismayed by the license of mobs, who were often prodded by Communists. In these ancient lands, the democratic tradition was often insecurely grafted upon an older, and more deeply rooted, system of authority of tribal leaders, sheiks, mullahs, wealthy landowners, noble families.

The problems faced by these young nations, newly awakened after centuries of neglect, were all but insuperable. Their expectations had run high; the prospect of freedom had seemed to promise a quick prosperity, too, and disillusion went deep. Everybody wanted the fruits of industrialism; everyone wanted to catch up with the West, but resources were often scant, and techniques unlearned. In the general dissatisfaction, democracy failed to function, because neither the electorate nor the leadership was prepared for its responsibilities. The inevitable response of many a patriot, as well as many a plotter, was to try the martial aid plan. They sent for the soldiers, or the colonels themselves took over without invitation.

Plea of Necessity. The result of the military takeover is often an increase in honesty and administrative efficiency, and usually a gain in stability. These are no small gains, even if democrats everywhere are disturbed. But power itself often produces further appetites and ambitions in those who feed on it, as in Nasser's case.

The respectable argument for military control in immature nations always rests on the necessity of a tutelage in self-government. It was an argument honestly advanced by the great Chinese Leader Sun Yatsen, but also used unscrupulously since by Lenin and many a tinpot Latin American dictator. Few were the strongmen, such as Turkey's late great Kemal Ataturk, who ruled strongly in order to prepare their country for democracy. The fiery-eyed young colonels of the Middle East and of Southeast Asia were perhaps entitled to the benefit of the doubt when they professed similar ambitions. But their real plea had to be necessity: military dictatorship was a step back, which might or might not be followed by a step forward.

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