The New Account

In the ordinary run of things, the members of the North Atlantic Alliance, like partners in a family firm, tend to take their union for granted. But last week, as December's annual meeting of NATO's Ministerial Council drew near, there was an outburst of hooting, hollering and name calling. France's Charles de Gaulle served notice that he was discontented with NATO's political structure. Britain's Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, until last month NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, was, as usual, chipperly dissatisfied with almost everybody.

Monty led off the chorus of complaint with the charge that NATO was "complicated, cumbersome and grossly overstaffed . . . an enormous waste of money and effort." NATO's next Supreme Commander in Europe, he declared, should be French, not American. Yet Europeans are the ones most insistent on a U.S. Supreme Commander because he guarantees the U.S. commitment on the Continent. "The fact is," said Montgomery, "we are really not an alliance . . . We are a group of nations unable to agree how to get where we want to go."

No doubt about it, the alliance had a sorry look last week. Its Eastern Mediterranean anchor was fouled by the Cyprus dispute, so that only a handful of Greek officers are back on duty at NATO's eastern headquarters in Izmir, Turkey. On the northwestern flank of the alliance, the "codfish war" between Britain and Iceland was hardly a war, but it was less than friendship.

Nearly a year had passed since NATO's members agreed "in principle" to the stationing of intermediate range U.S. missiles in Europe, but not a single missile base has been established anywhere on the Continent. NATO's minimum military ambition--a 30-division shield force in Western Europe--remains unachieved. West Germany, which promised to contribute twelve combat-ready divisions by the end of 1959, has only seven in being, will probably take four years to assemble the rest.

France, which should have four divisions in the NATO line, has siphoned off 2 1/2 for the fighting in Algeria. Far from being apologetic. French Chief of Staff General Paul Ely last week demanded that NATO commit itself to the defense of all French territories in Africa. "Upon pain of death," declared General Ely, NATO must develop a "peripheral strategy" to prevent the U.S.S.R. from subverting Africa and thereby turning NATO's Mediterranean flank.

Time for a Raise. Ely's boss, General Charles de Gaulle, posed a problem to NATO too. Endlessly jealous of French prestige, De Gaulle more than a month ago sent off private letters to Dwight Eisenhower and Britain's Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. Their contents remain secret, but their gist was leaked out: France should be admitted to equal partnership with Britain and the U.S. in a kind of informal three-power NATO dictatorate in world affairs. "Unacceptable." cried Bonn. "Wounds the feelings and the rights of Italy." complained Premier Amintore Fanfani. The French Foreign Office blandly assured everybody that De Gaulle did not have in mind any "modification of NATO."

Nonetheless. De Gaulle plainly still thinks of France as a kind of third force in Western affairs, allied to Britain and the U.S.. but free to play an independent role when her own power interests are at stake. "There are two world groups--that of the Anglo-Saxons and that of the Soviets." he told a press conference fortnight ago. announcing France's intention to go anead with nuclear weapons development. "While [they] remain overarmed, France will not accept a gigantic, chronic inferiority. Besides, when we become an atomic power, a day which is not far off. we will have all the greater means of making ourselves felt in the spheres that are dear to us . . ."

Fair Warning. Bitter voices proclaimed that De Gaulle's insistence on great power status for France "will wreck NATO." But, in fact, De Gaulle's advent to power, bringing stability to France, is probably worth more to NATO than any difficulty he can provoke. Said one hardheaded U.S. official, pointing to the grave economic and political problems still facing France: "We will cash De Gaulle's check when he has a balance in the bank." De Gaulle's letters to President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan were fair warning that he plans to open an account.

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