After Mikoyan

From the far corners of the globe this week the elite of the Marxist world converged on Moscow for the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. Red China's Chou En-lai arrived by plane, leaving Mao and the rest of the Chinese leadership behind, obviously preoccupied. In Chou's wake moved lesser lights, ranging from East Germany's Walter Ulbricht down to James Jackson, the U.S. Communist Party's secretary for Southern and Negro affairs.

Mirrored in the watchful faces of the gathering Communist clan was the realization that the 21st Party Congress could well prove as momentous as the 20th Congress three years ago. at which Khrushchev tearfully and historically denounced Stalin. For weeks past, ominous hints have been gathering that Khrushchev might use the occasion to deal a final blow to his disgraced foes -the "antiparty group" composed of Malenkov, Bulganin. Molotov, Shepilov and Kaganovich. In the usual Communist technique, a crime has to be found to match the punishment, and Khrushchev may well blame the U.S.S.R.'s prime economic problem -low agricultural productivity -on the antiparty men, thus satisfying two desires at once. But the rest of the world was likely to center its interest in the Congress on the report that brash, quick-witted Anastas Mikoyan had brought back from his U.S. "vacation."

In a two-hour, U.S.-style press conference within the ancient Kremlin* walls, Mikoyan reported to the Soviet press on his trip. In high good humor, he told of visiting the dacha of Cleveland Industrialist Cyrus Eaton, and of a luncheon at which he had pressed "my old friend" former Governor Averell Harriman to revisit Moscow now that Nelson Rockefeller had freed him to travel. Mikoyan paid tribute to American women -"they were very nice to us; they cannot hide their feelings as well as a man" -and recalled with evident relish his luncheon with those archvillains of Communist mythology, the bankers of Wall Street.

From the Soviet point of view, it was a disturbing fact that Mikoyan's trip had made no visible dent in the unity of the Western allies. British and French officialdom, in a rare vote of confidence in U.S. diplomatic skill, admiringly agreed that Washington had handled Mikoyan adroitly. In West Germany the U.S. had accomplished the diplomatic equivalent of the hat trick. While rock-hard Chancellor Konrad Adenauer rejoiced in his belief that the U.S. had "held firm" against Mikoyan's blandishments, the opposition Social Democratic Party was happily convinced that the U.S. had displayed "new flexibility." Combat of Paris reflected a common European sentiment: "Mikoyan interested, aroused and amused America but did not capture it."

On with the Dance. One reason for Western unity was that Mikoyan's trip had produced no results concrete enough to argue about. Moscow had not abandoned its insistence that the Western powers must get out of Berlin, and the U.S. had not faltered in its resolve to stay there with its allies. But, though nobody had made any concessions of principle, Mikoyan's reconnaissance mission had helped to produce a subtle change in the diplomatic climate. Russia had soft-pedaled its original ultimatum to the West to get out of Berlin in six months -or else. Secretary of State Dulles, in his much-picked-over press-conference statement that free elections might not be "the only method" of reunifying Germany, had signaled the Kremlin that he was willing to go on with the diplomatic dance. Four-power talks on Germany were now considered probable and soon.

Unless either Russia or the West sharply revised its position, such a conference could be no more than a high-level exchange of recriminations. So far the Russians have shown an eagerness to talk and a total unwillingness to compromise. The Western powers, separately and together, are looking for new stratagems, spurred by the knowledge that Khrushchev has confronted them with difficult decisions over Berlin. At Dulles' orders, the State Department's thinkers are not to exclude from consideration any idea, however wild it may seem. This included Russia's vague proposal for a German confederation, i.e., some kind of federal union of East and West Germany loose enough to allow East Germany's Communist rulers to retain a measure of control in their region. And the military are at work on alternate plans to supply Berlin by air and by ground, or in combination.

The Escape Route. Readiness to talk is no longer considered a need to reach disadvantageous agreement. "Who the hell is looking for ideas the Russians will accept?" snapped one British official last week. "What we need are brilliant ideas to discuss with Russia." If Russian intransigence over German reunification is so great that no agreement is possible, so be it -but the West will have shown itself not afraid to discuss and explore. (This is an argument particularly dear to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who will probably be facing a general election this year.) If the conference is in session by May 27 -the expiration of Russia's six-month deadline to turn over to her East German puppets control of land and air routes into Berlin -Khrushchev will be able to retreat, if he feels the need to. from his earlier threats, on the ground that "peaceful negotiations" are already in progress.

* The second in Kremlin history. The first was Khrushchev's, last November.

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