The Message

With an arrogance unparalleled since the days of Russia's sometime ally, Adolf Hitler, Khrushchev in his Kremlin speech talked to the point on the Khrushchev-made Berlin crisis. Burden of his blast: all the worried maneuverings of Western diplomats have been wasted effort.

"On no account will we agree to discuss the reunification of Germany." Khrushchev trumpeted. "Let the Germans themselves sit at a round table and solve this problem." Scornfully, he pooh-poohed the Big Four Foreign Ministers' conference on Germany proposed by the West--Gromyko would be too busy. Added Khrushchev: "It is well known that when people want to shelve a problem, it is drowned in endless verbiage from which, as from a swampy marsh, there is no exit." If the West really wanted a solution, it would have to agree to a summit conference, whose subject matter would be limited by Khrushchev. And it must not be a Big Four meeting like Geneva; Czechoslovakia and Poland would have to be included to give the Communists "parity."

Whether or not there was a summit, Khrushchev plainly intended--for last week, at least--to go ahead with his plans to turn control of the access routes into West Berlin over to the East German Communists. If the West would not agree to a Russian-drafted World War II peace treaty with both East and West Germany, Khrushchev would sign a separate treaty with the East Germans--after negotiating terms during his visit to the Leipzig trade fair this week. At that point "the [postwar] agreement on the division of Berlin into two sectors and hence on its occupation status will ipso facto fall away."

Beneath the impulsive language, the full outline of the Russian design could be plainly seen, and for Russian purposes it had been adroitly conceived. Moscow has divided its German policy into two categories. One is directed at the statesmen of the U.S., Britain and France, the other to the people of West Germany. For each audience, Khrushchev had an unmistakable message:

To the Western Big Three. Russia is not fundamentally interested in "relaxation of tensions," in the Rapacki disengagement plan, a "thinning out" of Soviet and U.S. troops in Central Europe, or any other ingenious schemes for an overall settlement of the German problem. What Khrushchev is determined to do, beyond all else, is t01) end Berlin's status as an outpost of Western power, and 2) oblige the West to accept, openly or implicitly, the permanence of the East German Communist state. To force the West's hand, Khrushchev denies that the Western powers any longer possess World War II "conquerors' rights" in Germany --which means that he does not concede them any legal justification for maintaining forces in Berlin or any legitimate interest in the future of East Germany. If there is to be any link between East and West Germany, it must1) be negotiated directly between them, and 2) ensure Russian control of East Germany.

To the West Germans. The one thing all Germans claim to want is reunification of Germany. Nobody can give it to them but Russia, and it won't. But Moscow would consent to a loose confederation between East and West Germany. The asking price: West German withdrawal from NATO, renunciation of nuclear weapons (which, the Russians indicated to the British, they regard as more dangerous in German hands than in any others). Khrushchev conceded that Adenauer would prefer NATO to a German confederation. But by so doing, said Atheist Khrushchev piously, Catholic Adenauer is rejecting "both the Christian and atheist" road to peace: "To live in friendship and to do everything to prevent the rule of evil on earth." And since Adenauer is an old man, he had best mend his ways fast, or, "according to Christian belief," he will soon "be severely judged by the heavenly court." Nikita's point: all West Germans with their eye on the main chance should start placing hedging bets with Moscow right now.

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