DIALOGUE IN GENEVA

Around the doughnut table in Geneva last week the talk went thus:

Andrei Gromyko -- The governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France have submitted for consideration by our conference a proposal in which many questions appear to be chained to each other . . . We are sure this plan was never designed to bring about agreement ... It stands to reason that this is a graphic manifestation of the technique of tying up problems of different nature in a single large tangle as a means of making their solution more difficult.

The governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France still cannot give up the idea that the Big Four allegedly possess some magic power to unite Germany . . . But why should this question be decided by anyone but the Germans themselves . . .?

The aim of the conference as we see it lies in separating out those questions that weigh most heavily on the relations between states . . . The Soviet government believes that the question of the conclusion of a [World War II] peace treaty with the two German states should be taken up first and the Berlin question be settled on this basis by transforming West Berlin into a free city.

Couve de Murville -- When I was listening to our colleague with my invariable interest, but this time with occasional astonishment at some of his particularly categorical judgments, I wondered why we Westerners had ever taken the trouble to draft this plan which we hoped in good faith might at least be discussed . . . [Mr. Gromyko's] reply moves me, indeed, to remark, adapting a French saying, that in discussion with the Soviet delegation, we pay for our past concessions.

One of the deadly sins with which Mr. Gromyko charges this Western proposal is what I might call the sin of being a package plan . . . All we have done, which indeed complicates the problems, has only one aim: to reply in advance to the Soviet government's objections and allay its fears. We understand perfectly well that reunification of Germany in freedom arouses anxiety in our Russian colleagues . . . [So] we thought it better to attach to German reunification a number of provisions relating to security and disarmament which would be likely to allay these Soviet misgivings.

The Soviet proposals are based on the assertion that German reunification is not a present-day problem, and can therefore be left until later. Nor is it a problem within the jurisdiction of the Big Four . . . The draftsmen of the Potsdam Treaties--U.S., Soviet Union and United Kingdom--would have been extremely surprised if they had been told that things would work out this way. Did they not point out very clearly that the peace treaty must be concluded with an all-German government? In fact, how could they possibly have imagined any other solution?

Selwyn Lloyd -- I have studied this [Soviet] draft peace treaty carefully. It has one merit. It is in itself a refutation of Mr. Gromyko's principal criticism of the Western peace plan: that it is a package. The Soviet draft shows clearly how interrelated are these various problems--reunification of Germany, security provisions, an interim status for Berlin . . . The Soviet treaty would be a Diktat . . . What the Soviet government is doing in effect is to show that they wish to impose terms on Germany as was done at Versailles.

Gromyko -- One gets the impression that when the Soviet Union demands the prohibition of atomic armaments for Germany, it is nearly a repetition of Versailles. But when the

Western powers pull in through the back door atomic and rocket weapons for the West German Bundeswehr, then it is an ideal of justice, an example of serving the interests of peace.

It is proposed to us that we lend a hand in the engulfment of East Germany by West Germany. We are expected to assist in tearing away the capitals of East Germany and in spreading the occupation regime throughout the whole of Berlin . . . Instead of moderating the bellicose inclinations of their West German ally, the Western powers encourage it in every way . . . One can hardly discern in all this even a hint of a wish to seek agreement, far less concessions.

Christian Herter -- We take particular exception to Mr. Gromyko's charge that the Western peace plan was formulated with the objective of reaching disagreement rather than agreement ... It constitutes an entirely serious attempt to reach an accommodation . . . The Soviet Foreign Minister's only answer is to restate the Soviet Union's insistence upon an immediate peace treaty with a divided Germany . . . Everyone knows that under this proposal reunification would be as unlikely as Mr. Khrushchev's "whistling shrimp."

Apparently the Soviet Union considers that its security interests are better protected by perpetuating the partition of Germany . . . It is the teaching of history that the artificial partition of a strong and vigorous people can only result in disaster for those who stand in the way of their reunification.

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