Monday, Oct. 26, 1959
Closer & Closer
In Paris last week, nightmare fear and an almost incredible hope ran side by side.
In an atmosphere of high mystery, France and the F.L.N. rebels moved ever closer to the direct negotiations that could put an end to five years of bloodshed in Algeria. Day after day, diplomats and intermediaries crisscrossed North Africa to exchange hints and glances in the feverish, delicate task of preparing bargaining positions. Rebel "President" Ferhat Abbas flew to Rabat to consult Morocco's King Mohammed V, whose son, Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, had established direct contact with Charles de Gaulle. The Paris weekly Jours de France quoted Abbas as telling its correspondent: "De Gaulle is a big caid [chief], and I am a big caid. So let's get together." Abbas' aides denied that he had made the statement, but few doubted that the interview had taken place. And Paris was plainly getting the signal; in the National Assembly, Premier Michel Debre emphasized that the French offer of cease-fire talks still stood, added that rebel leaders would be guaranteed safe conduct home if discussions collapsed.
Thunder from the Right. Facing a tense Chamber at the outset of a three-day debate on Algeria, Debre insisted that the De Gaulle government had no intention of entering into political negotiations with the rebels, only the desire to "get out of the cycle of violence in which Algeria is locked, and to re-enter the reign of law." But there were thunderous hoots of disbelief from right-wing diehards, who were determined to stymie De Gaulle's plan for Algerian self-determination (TIME, Sept. 28). Most of the deputies from Algeria boycotted the session, and the Gaullist U.N.R. Party was shaken by the angry resignation of nine right-wingers, who considered any concessions--even talks with the rebels--as the first step toward France's total loss of Algeria. "I refuse all solutions of compromise," cried tough Colonel Robert ("Leather Nose") Thomazo, as he walked out.
But these were the noisy political fringes. In the end the Assembly voted confidence in De Gaulle's Algerian program by an overwhelming 441 to 23.
The Shadow of Violence. Unable to carry the day by parliamentary means, the extremists coldly set out to create an atmosphere of near civil war, reminiscent of the May 1958 uprising that toppled the Fourth Republic. At midweek, Gaullist Lucien Neuwirth, World War II underground fighter, publicly charged that a "commando of killers" had crossed into France from Spain with orders to assassinate leading ministers, government officials, and newspaper editors. Police pooh-poohed the warning until Left-Wing Senator Franc,ois Mitterrand, who supports negotiations with the F.L.N., narrowly escaped death in the heart of Paris, when unidentified machine gunners riddled his car. Alarmed at last, the government doubled police guards for ministers, offered protection to prominent private citizens, and tightened security around De Gaulle. In Algeria, where European ultras circulated leaflets charging that they had been "betrayed" by "traitors" in France, the army set up roadblocks around Algiers to guard against an invasion of the city by extremist settlers from outlying villages.
On both shores of the Mediterranean, the menace of violence lay like a dark shadow over what might well prove the last, best hope for a peaceful settlement of the Algerian fighting. Once again, only the vast prestige of Charles de Gaulle could carry France through to a happy conclusion.
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