An End of One's Own

Shortly before the beaten German armies surrendered in 1945, Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French forces, received a secret appeal from Nazi Gestapo Boss Heinrich Himmler:

"Granted, you have won. Knowing what you started from. General de Gaulle, one takes off one's hat to you. But now what are you going to do? Rely on the Anglo-Saxons? They will treat you as a satellite. Range yourself with the Soviets? They will impose their rule on France and liquidate you. The only way to win greatness and independence for your nation is by an entente with beaten Germany. If you master the spirit of revenge, if you seize the opportunity that history offers you today, you will be the greatest man of all time."

In 1959 Charles de Gaulle, President of France, in the final volume of his memoirs (still to be published in the U.S.), made Himmler's message public and added: "Remove the flattery of myself contained in this message from the edge of the grave* and there certainly remained some truth in the glimpse of future possibilities that it offered."

Smaller Germany. Last week, as these possibilities unfolded, the Germans were increasingly disturbed by the future glimpses they saw. Into Paris, in a Luftwaffe transport, flew Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to see his old friend De Gaulle. Convinced that it is his historic mission to end the disastrous century-old rivalry between France and Germany, Adenauer has committed Germany's future to partnership with France, and he was alarmed by the direction De Gaulle was taking.

Since his first meeting with Adenauer 15 months ago, De Gaulle has treated West Germany as a junior partner, has shown a lofty lack of concern for German sensibilities. So far, his government has made no public apology for the French navy's high-seas seizure six weeks ago of the West German freighter Bilbao, suspected of carrying arms to the Algerian rebels. De Gaulle has put it more bluntly than anyone else: he regards the present frontiers between Poland and Germany as permanent and dismisses the German dream of recovering the "lost provinces." De Gaulle is obviously no enthusiast for a reunited Germany that would be bigger in population than France. In his memoirs (now compulsory reading in all alert chancelleries), De Gaulle described his postwar German policy--"end of the centralized Reich, autonomy for the left bank of the Rhine," and some kind of loose federal regime, which, he said, was the only way that "the Russians might allow the Prussian and Saxon territories to remain branches of the main trunk."

The Old One-Two. Ostensibly, the De Gaulle-Adenauer meeting was just one more of those international tete-`a-tetes at which complete agreement is afterwards proclaimed. But Adenauer was disturbed. In recent weeks, De Gaulle has openly proclaimed his intention of establishing France as an "atomic third force" and explicitly rejected the concept of integrated European defense that is the foundation of NATO strategic planning. When Adenauer landed at Orly Airport last week, the question uppermost in his mind was whether he could maintain his alliance with Gaullist France without undercutting his longstanding and deeper dedication to NATO and the U.S.

Forewarned of Adenauer's glum mood, the French subjected him to a diplomatic one-two. As a mere chief of government, Adenauer did not get to see Chief of State de Gaulle immediately; instead, the Chancellor's first discussions were with brisk Premier Michel Debre--who proceeded to restate in extreme form the De Gaulle positions that disturbed Adenauer. At bottom, Debre made clear, De Gaulle's doubts about integrated NATO planning rest on its assumption of the continued presence in Europe of U.S. troops. "The fate of Europe," insisted Debre, "is not connected with the presence of U.S. forces . . . For Europe, France and Germany should play the capital role. Alliances, including the Atlantic alliance, are merely alliances."

Back to Bonaparte? While Adenauer brooded in glacial silence, West Germany's Press Chief Felix von Eckardt publicly slapped back at Debre. "The Chancellor," Von Eckardt told newsmen, "does not think it possible to maintain an alliance between 15 states without a certain degree of integration." As for the notion of France as an atomic third force, "it is not realistic." Muttered Adenauer to Von Eckardt later: "Good job, but you could have gone further."

Having alarmed Adenauer with Debre, the French then exposed their visitor from across the Rhine to the second half of the treatment: the De Gaulle charm. In several hours of private conversation, De Gaulle blandly assured Adenauer that he regarded NATO as "vital" and had no intention of removing any further French forces from NATO command. Beaming with pleasure, the 83-year-old Adenauer told reporters: "We found ourselves agreed on all essential points."

Other Germans were not so sure. They were for ties with France so long as they did not tangle relations with the rest of the Western world. Many West German businessmen deplore an anti-British flavor in France's attitude to the Common Market, and fear a trade war between those inside and those outside that might divide Europe and jeopardize NATO. In Britain, the expression "Bonapartist Europe" is beginning to be heard.

Time after time in his memoirs, Charles de Gaulle returns to a single somber theme: "I felt certain that, although friendly nations might sympathize with us, the iron rule of a state is to give nothing for nothing." With such philosophy, De Gaulle should have been the first to recognize that a man who sets out to lead an international coalition can only lead his allies in a direction that seems to them to serve their own ends too.

* Captured by British troops in May 1945, Himmler killed himself by breaking with his teeth a vial of potassium cyanide secreted in his mouth.

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