In the Scales

In the sixth year of the Algerian war, thanks to the patient, often oblique maneuverings of Charles de Gaulle, France was negotiating from a far stronger position than anyone could have predicted two years earlier.

Militarily, the F.L.N. rebels were at a low ebb. F.L.N. terrorism, which as late as 1957 killed scores of Algerian civilians every week, is now confined to occasional and increasingly infrequent bombings. Some 20,000 well-equipped F.L.N. fighters stationed in Tunisia still keep 35,000 French troops tied up along the electrified Morice Line, but rebel breakthrough attempts are costly and seldom successful. Inside Algeria, rebel units that in early 1958 were big enough to fight pitched battles with crack French outfits are now reduced to 30 or 40 men apiece, and religiously flee all contact with French troops. The French boast that there are now nearly 50% more Moslems (160,000) fighting for France than for the F.L.N. rebel forces.

The In-Betweens. Politically, the rebels were in better shape. Despite De Gaulle's hopes to the contrary, the economic boom in Algiers (TIME, June 20) and other Algerian cities has not won over to the French cause even those Moslems who benefit from it. Though few of them dare express their views for fear of French army reprisals, the bulk of Algeria's Moslems, including some who outwardly "collaborate" with France, continue to sympathize with the F.L.N. demand for independence. Higher wages for Moslem workers often help finance a bigger contribution to F.L.N. coffers, and time and again, French authorities have announced the destruction of the rebel "politico-administrative" organization in an Algerian town only to find it totally rebuilt within a few months.

But, trapped as they are between French violence and rebel violence, Algeria's Moslems increasingly yearn for the end of a war that has cost (by French estimates) the lives of 250,000 rebels. The French army has confined 11,000 Algerians in concentration camps, forced 1,500,000 men, women and children into "regroupment centers" whose squalor is unmatched even by the Arab refugee camps on Israel's borders. When a French radio reporter toured Algiers' casbah last week seeking reaction to the rebel decision to try negotiations, the few Moslems who would talk at all would say only that they were for peace.

Tougher than Bony. Since the Algiers settlers' insurrection of last January (TIME, Feb. 8 et seg.), De Gaulle has systematically "purged" the French army in Algeria by retiring or transferring senior officers who sought to sabotage his policy of self-determination for Algeria. To tighten his hold on the army still further, De Gaulle last week prolonged for nine months Gaullist General Paul Ely's tenure as chief of France's joint chiefs of staff, and named as army chief of staff Gaullist General Louis Le Puloch --of whom one French officer nervously remarked: "When it comes to discipline, Napoleon was a softie compared to Le Puloch."

So far, the army in Algeria has accepted the opening of negotiations with the rebels with quiet watchfulness. So had Algeria's 1,000,000 "French" settlers, who had learned from their defeat last January that spontaneous violence is no substitute for political organization in depth. Setting up headquarters in a hardware store opposite Algiers' town hall, right-wing settlers formed a new "Front de l'Algerie Francaise" dedicated to "keeping Algeria in the Republic," within three days declared they had signed up 100,000 members--including several hundred army officers. Threatened Algerian Deputy Rene Vinciguerra: "Let De Gaulle see Ferhat Abbas in Paris. We don't mind. But the minute he allows Abbas back in Algeria, we will really move."

In the end, De Gaulle might find the French Algerians harder to settle with than the weary rebels.

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