The Perils of Postponement

During the long autumn of the election campaign. President Eisenhower tried to postpone making decisions on as many controversial problems as possible, to keep them from being distorted by partisan heat (as were Cuba and Quemoy-Matsu). Postponement has its price, and particularly in foreign affairs, as the Eisenhower Administration could see last week when in its last two months in office it tried to confront the serious threat to the stability of the dollar, and the question of nuclear individualism in Western Europe.

Dramatic Gesture. Off to Bonn flew Treasury Secretary Robert B. Anderson to talk like a Dutch uncle to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, demanding that the prosperous West Germans help stop the steady drain of U.S. gold reserves, which last week dipped below $18 billion for the first time since 1940. Anderson's major demand was that Adenauer shoulder the costs of keeping U.S. troops in West Germany--some $600 million per year. The Germans refused, making some promising counteroffers (see FOREIGN NEWS), but under the rigid terms set by Anderson himself the mission had to be counted a failure--for the moment, at least. Though Anderson was accompanied by Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon, State Department sources spread the word that both Foggy Bottom and the U.S. embassy in Bonn were "unhappy" about Anderson's methods.

The President had deliberately let the problem slide until after the U.S. elections. In the circumstances, both Ike and Anderson felt that a dramatic gesture was needed to get across his message: that the U.S. expects its affluent allies to do more toward carrying the free world's burdens. In the long run, the demands on West Germany might well be met in one form or another--to the eventual benefit of the Kennedy Administration. But in the short run, the Administration came in for heavy criticism. The cause was not helped much by Vice President-elect Lyndon Johnson, who, in Paris for a NATO meeting, stressed that the actions of the outgoing Administration "do not necessarily reflect" Kennedy Administration policies.

Pointed Prods. The touchy question of whether to arm NATO with nuclear weapons has been buzzing around for several years. It is one way to counter De Gaulle's disruptive go-it-alone nuclear ambitions. It would also provide an out for those who fear nuclear weapons in Germany's hands. The State Department has been talking a long time about presenting a U.S. plan to the NATO meeting this month, creating a nuclear armed strategic force under NATO command. But the details have not been worked out.

Last week, at the Paris meeting of parliamentarians from NATO nations, U.S. General Lauris Norstad, wearing his hat as NATO supreme commander, Europe, proposed creation of a NATO nuclear force. A committee of NATO parliamentarians approved a resolution declaring that a NATO nuclear force of some type was "urgent." Norstad's speech and the resolution were regarded as pointed prods to Washington to get going on the specifics. NATO also wondered what had become of Secretary of State Christian Herter's promise of a year ago to present a broad plan for a new NATO political and economic program at the December session.

When actions are overdue, the responses are likely to be overly abrupt, as the Anderson mission showed. The other equally serious temptation among bureaucrats is to point lamely to their lame-duck liabilities, to let things slide through the period of interregnum, and to say that it is up to the new Administration to make new decisions.

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