The Good Result

In the gilt isolation of Paris' Elysee Palace, President Charles de Gaulle last week savored his victory in the nationwide referendum. "A good result," said De Gaulle contentedly. When a Minister suggested that he should make a speech of thanks to the electorate, De Gaulle replied loftily, "France cannot thank France," and then retired into that aloof silence which he has said "enhances authority."

Peaceful Yes. His attitude--somewhere between that of a benevolent emperor and a stern schoolteacher--was justified by the results. Fully 75% of French voters said yes to De Gaulle, and he carried every single department in France. Jacques Soustelle, his most important and gifted antagonist, campaigned fiercely in Lyon, where he was elected Deputy in 1958, and lost. "Let us recognize the brutal fact," said Soustelle when the results were in. "Algeria must interpret the vote as a gesture of abandonment."

The diehards could not even find consolation in the 22% of the French voters who abstained. In the previous referendum, abstentions ran to 15%, and the balance can be accounted for by bad weather and local issues. But the abstentions in Algeria were another matter. In the big cities of Algiers and Oran, hundreds of thousands of Moslems stayed stubbornly at home in obedience to the orders of Ferhat Abbas and the rebel F.L.N. Out in the countryside, many Moslems who did vote had to be rounded up by the army and trucked to the polls. "There were two referendums," said a Moslem. "One in France for De Gaulle. One in Algeria for Ferhat Abbas."

Even with slightly more than half of the Moslems staying home, the outnumbered Europeans were swamped more than 2 to 1 by those Moslems who went to the polls. From the safety of his self-exile in Spain, fiery Pierre Lagaillarde insisted the "F.L.N. flag will never fly over Algiers. We will fight!" But the Europeans in Algeria were drained of such bravado, recognizing at long last that Algerie FranC,aise is dead. They no longer expect help from the French army, which was once their stoutest ally. Even before the referendum, the army showed grudging loyalty to De Gaulle and dismayed the die-hards by opening fire on a European mob for the first time in Algeria's history.

The referendum convinced even the soldiers who believed in Algerie FranC,aise. "We cannot oppose France and De Gaulle now," said an officer last week. "We thought we were here to guarantee French sovereignty . . . Now we know the French people have a different idea. We must consent by maintaining discipline. But a lot of young officers are not holding their heads high today." The officer corps deeply remembers the war years when Vichyite and Gaullist troops clashed in Syria and Dakar. Above all else, French generals are determined that "never again must the army be divided against itself or against the nation."

Where Now? In their panicky fear of abandonment, Europeans searched for a way out and looked nervously to recently independent Tunisia and Morocco for a hint of their fate. The facts were sobering. In Tunisia, only 60,000 Frenchmen remain of the 180,000 who lived there on independence day five years ago. More than 100,000 of the 350,000 French who resided in Morocco have left. Most have returned to France. But more than half of the million Europeans in Algeria are of Spanish, Italian and Corsican descent, have no family or economic links with France, and work as farmers, mechanics, postmen and plumbers. "Where can we go?" asked one. Said another glumly: "If the Moslems treat us the way we used to treat them, we will all have to flee."

The last-ditch French plan for ethnic partition had always been more of a threat than a realistic alternative. Under it, the big coastal cities were expected to remain as European enclaves, safely French in sentiment. But the heavy abstention rate among city Moslems indicated a weight of pro-F.L.N. sentiment that makes the plan totally unrealistic.

Except to announce that the referendum law was now in force, De Gaulle typically gave no indication of his next move. The law calls for the establishment of autonomous executives and legislatures in Algeria. But no competent or trustworthy Moslem candidates are likely to step forward without F.L.N. approval.

What was reasonably certain was that De Gaulle would attempt to reopen talks with the F.L.N. itself. In effect, the yes vote in France was a declaration in favor of peace, negotiated on the best terms that De Gaulle could get. The problem would be to find a formula that could save face for both sides, bring the F.L.N. into the new Algeria on friendly terms. Until that attempt was made, De Gaulle was unlikely to push ahead with his promised all-Algerian government.

But Charles de Gaulle has seldom worked by any book except his own. He is a man addicted not to step-by-step plans or programs but to grand conceptions grandly achieved. For better or worse, France had voted to entrust Algeria to Charles de Gaulle.

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