Frondizi's Odds

One of the most sacrosanct of Latin American sacred cows is state control of production and processing of such fundamental resources as petroleum. Last week Argentina's President Arturo Frondizi,who is not bullied by sacred cows, took pen in hand and signed a $90 million deal whereby two U.S. companies and one British firm will build Argentina's first petrochemical plants to produce synthetic rubber and industrial chemicals. In many Latin lands, such action would have brought out the mobs to smash windows and shout "Yankee, no!" In Argentina, conditioned by three years of watching Frondizi leap from crisis to crisis like Eliza crossing the ice, there was no visible reaction.

Disillusioned Daughter. One factor in Frondizi's favor is his obvious dedication to the immense job of clearing away the economic and political wreckage left by 9 1/2 years of Dictator Juan Peron. To get himself elected in 1958, Frondizi wooed the votes of both the nationalists and Peron's still-loyal masses, who believed in big government and big giveaways. Once in office, Frondizi decided that only austerity and a sizable injection of foreign capital could save Argentina. He then coolly sought the backing of the bitterly anti-Peron armed forces to force through what he knew was certain to be an unpopular program.

Deliberately turning his back on his supporters, Frondizi refused to legalize the Peronistas as a political party, outlawed the Communists, clamped down on the Castroites. He violated every nationalistic precept by dealing with foreign oil companies to develop Argentina's state-owned oilfields, a task the oilmen proceeded to work at so diligently that Argentina expects to turn from an importer to an exporter of oil this year. He let foreign power companies expand Argentine electric power production, threw open the nation's iron-ore beds to overseas investors.

Inevitably, Frondizi faced crisis after crisis--either from the street or from Argentina's military brass, increasingly aware of Frondizi's dependence on them. Street cries he met with strength; military ultimatums he usually satisfied by allowing an incumbent army Minister to be replaced by the armed forces' favorite of the moment. His friends turned away, repelled by his pragmatic acceptance of government by wiggle, dodge and compromise; his own daughter, convinced that he had jettisoned all principle, moved out of his house. The popular vote of 4,100,000 that carried him to office in 1958 dropped to 3,000,000 for his candidates in the 1960 congressional elections. It may drop even farther in congressional elections next month in the federal district of Buenos Aires.

Better Than Even Money. At last count, Frondizi had weathered no fewer than 28 identifiable crises in his relatively short term of office. Yet it is plain that each upheaval is a little less threatening than the one before. It is also clear that none of Frondizi's opponents feel strongly enough to apply the final measure of pressure needed to turn out Argentina's lonely and unpopular President. Feelings have become more and more neutral, and one of Buenos Aires' leading papers now aptly and blandly describes Frondizi as "the President we managed to get."

President Frondizi's chances of survival to the end of his six-year term, once considered unlikely in the extreme, are now a better-than-even-money proposition. And as the results of his policies start to show --inflation cut, unemployment virtually wiped out, the peso strengthened, retail sales up--the odds should begin to lengthen considerably.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.