Blasting the Ban

Prime among the Soviets' goals is to disarm the U.S., if possible, by talk. In this they have had some success. For 27 months, while the Soviets dragged out the nuclear test-ban talks at Geneva, the U.S. has refrained from nuclear testing without any guarantee that the U.S.S.R. was doing the same. Last week the Atomic Energy Commission warned that a continued unpoliced moratorium presents "risks to free world supremacy in nuclear weapons.''

The report, signed by outgoing AEC Chief John McCone and the three commissioners who will remain under the new Administration, argued that further testing by either side would achieve "major advances in weapons design.'' Behind their wall of secrecy the Soviets could test clandestinely either underground or in outer space. "The military advantages to be gained from clandestine nuclear testing are great." said the report. "The probabilities of detecting and identifying clandes tine tests are very small." The Neutron Bomb. Pentagon worriers go a step farther than AEC. They argue that the U.S. cannot afford to remain stagnant in nuclear development even if the Soviets do, for clear-cut U.S. nuclear superiority is the best deterrent to attack. A few further nuclear tests, they say, would boost threefold the blast power of the two key U.S. deterrent missiles -- the mobile, solid-fueled Polaris and Minuteman --which now carry warheads of one-half megaton, v. an estimated eight megatons for Soviet ICBMs. Testing would also speed development of a next-generation "neutron bomb." Now on the drawing boards, that weapon is designed to bom bard a specific area with showers of le thal, invisible neutron "bullets." Because its fusion reaction is to be triggered by conventional explosives instead of "dirty" fission, there is much less blast or radioactive contamination--so that the bombarded area is left intact and friendly troops could occupy it. Furthermore, neutron weapons would be much lighter and cheaper than existing nuclear weapons, thus have enormous implications for brush-fire-war tactics.

The first power to possess the neutron bomb will gain great military superiority and flexibility. By their own admission, the Soviets have been experimenting toward such a bomb since 1952, though there is no evidence that they have tested it. But tests are easy to conceal in the absence of great blast or fallout. The U.S.

is stalled in the blueprint stage while the test ban continues. It is prepared to make important data-collecting tests within 60 days after the ban ends, but prototype tests would be many months away.

The Prime Risk. Balanced against the military scientific risks of maintaining the ban are the political-diplomatic risks of rescinding it. The Soviets have mobilized much of the world's opinion for a ban by 1) propagandizing the terrors of nuclear fallout, 2) giving the illusion that an agreement was always just around the corner at Geneva. President Eisenhower was persuaded by his diplomats that a resumption of testing would be harmful to the U.S. in the United Nations, persuaded by his scientific advisers that the risk of Russian cheating was outweighed by the chance that Geneva might produce a breakthrough on the inspection issue that would lead to general disarmament.

But AEC, while favoring any inspected test ban, obviously thinks that an unpoliced ban 27 months old is now the prime risk. Last week President Kennedy said he is willing to negotiate toward "an effective and enforceable treaty," and he has asked for a delay until March 21 to review the U.S. position. During the election campaign, he promised to set a time limit on the Geneva negotiations--and presumably also to resume underground tests--if the Russians do not meet it.

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