Scapegoat Wanted

In their embarrassment over the mutiny, some Frenchmen looked hard for some scapegoat who was not French. Much of the French press, egged on by some French officials, tried at length to implicate the U.S., zeroing in on that favorite target of recent weeks, the Central Intelligence Agency.

The story, as printed in even such reputable papers as Le Monde, was that CIA agents urged Challe on in hopes of preventing an independent Algeria that they feared would go Communist. Adding credibility to the story was the fact that Challe was an articulate supporter of NATO and a critic of De Gaulle's obstinate objections to putting French forces under NATO command. And on his last tour of duty before retirement, Challe was Commander, Allied Forces, Central Europe, where he was in daily contact with U.S. officers serving at his headquarters in Fontainebleau. Some French officials, who have long resented CIA dabbling in Laos and South Viet Nam, fed the rumors.

By the second day of the revolt, the story had become so widespread that U.S. Ambassador James M. Gavin urgently asked Washington to counter the rumors by having President Kennedy cable a message of full support to De Gaulle. Gavin took the message over to the Elysee Palace himself late that same night.

But the French newspapers happily embroidered the tale. They recalled darkly that on April 4, 1960, two months after he was kicked out of De Gaulle's Cabinet for his ultra sympathies, Jacques Soustelle had had lunch in Washington with CIA's Deputy Director Richard Bissell. Some papers went on to charge that CIA agents had met with the plotters in Madrid ten days before the coup, that they had known all the plans but had kept Kennedy and Ambassador Gavin in the dark.

"Utter and complete nonsense," answered the State Department. CIA pointed out that the Soustelle lunch had been arranged by the French embassy, and French embassy personnel attended. CIA said that, like the French government, it knew about the plot except for the timing, which was a surprise.

Conceivably. Challe might have construed cocktail concurrence or individual sympathy as a hope for solid support. At any rate, he was disappointed. A rebel emissary did indeed turn up at the U.S. consulate general in Algiers with a request for some kind of aid. He was rebuffed, told flatly his request was fantastic.

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