Partition or Else

President Charles de Gaulle was amiable and casual as he moved among his guests gathered on the lovely lawns of the Elysee Palace for his annual garden reception. But his words were calculated and blunt.

To a group of Deputies clustered around his towering figure, he revealed: "I have decided today to bring back one division from Algeria. Others will follow." De Gaulle was determined to disentangle France quickly from Algeria. "The affair must be settled before the end of the year," he rumbled, because "after that, we must concern ourselves with Europe." He obviously had an eye on whatever crisis Khrushchev was hatching. Later in the week it was announced that a squadron of 72 jets will return to France from Algeria this month, to be followed by two armored divisions.

If peace talks with Algerian nationalists fail, De Gaulle went on, he will partition Algeria, regrouping French Algerians and pro-French Moslems in the coastal cities. For both sides, the implications of partition were staggering. Even in Algiers, Moslems outnumber Europeans 400,000 to 300,000, and the city Moslems have been passionately dedicated to the F.L.N. cause. Presumably they would have to be evacuated to the Moslem area at the cost of hopelessly dislocating the industrial and commercial life of the city. The probable French area contains 74% of the country's industries, does 77% of its business, and produces 70% of its agricultural crops. Almost brutally, De Gaulle forecast what partition would do to Moslem Algeria: "It will revert to what it was in 1830, that is to say, anarchy and chaos."

De Gaulle conceded that the partition threat would be a "last recourse." In fact, there were reports that the stalled peace talks would resume in a few days, even though the quiet contacts that had continued between the French and the F.L.N. had produced no yielding on important differences, particularly on what would happen to the Sahara.

Having bluntly set straight some major points of French policy, De Gaulle set off on a five-day tour of eastern France to call for national unity and rally support. Both were obviously needed. Back in Paris, Deputies of the National Assembly were openly irritated at his disdain for their views, needled him with a petty but rare legislative defeat. Taunting the government ministers with the obvious fact that all important decisions are made by De Gaulle and no one else, former Premier Georges Bidault snapped: "We are the appearance of a Parliament which debates with the appearance of a government."

Outside Paris, the boiling discontent of farmers spread through France, and farm vehicles blocked miles of vacation traffic.

And there was always Berlin. Demanding unity and rebuking the farmers, De Gaulle told his listeners on his tours: "In the threats from the East, there is that which is serious and that which is bluff. But it is not in parading and in lying down on roads that one turns aside the storm."

At his garden party, De Gaulle had told a guest that when "the Algerian affair is settled," there will no longer be need for dictatorial powers, adding sourly, "and there won't even be need of De Gaulle."

But obviously he felt that he was still needed as of now.

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