Fait Accompli in Berlin

For weeks the U.S. and its Western allies had been planning to meet the Berlin showdown that Nikita Khrushchev had threatened for the autumn of 1961, when he would sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany and thereby leave Allied access to Berlin in the grasping hands of East Germany's Red puppet, Walter Ulbricht (see THE WORLD). But among all the contingency plans in the files at the State Department, not one dealt with a positive response to a blockade of the border between East and West Berlin. Thus, last week, when the Communists dropped the Iron Curtain on that border, the West was caught flatfooted.

Western astonishment was all too visible. For four days, while angry West Berliners (joined by the U.S.'s able Ambassador to Bonn, Walter Bowling) pleaded for some swift, positive response to the crass Communist shutdown, the West said nothing. Then, belatedly, the U.S., Britain and France issued brief, identically worded protests urging the Soviet Union to "put an end to these illegal measures." Predictably, the U.S.S.R. rejected the protests out-of-hand.

All week long, in round after round of conferences at the White House, President Kennedy and his foreign policy advisers discussed the steps that the U.S. should take in response to the border barrier. They quickly rejected retaliatory measures against East Germany--such as travel restrictions on Ulbricht's diplomats or a trade embargo--as either too small or too large for the occasion. Weighing heavily in Washington's sense of restraint was the feeling that the Communist world, using armed guards to prevent the flight of its own citizens, had suffered a fearful propaganda defeat in the eyes of the world.

Testing Promises. Two decisions were finally reached. To test past Russian promises that the Berlin barricades had no effect on the allied right of access to the city. President Kennedy decided to reinforce the 5,000-man U.S. garrison in Berlin, ordered 1,500 troops of the 8th Division to cross East Germany along the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn in armored trucks. In a more dramatic move, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson was sent off to Bonn and Berlin to shore up West German morale (Kennedy briefly considered and quickly rejected the idea of making the trip himself). Accompanying Johnson was a symbolic reminder of U.S. determination: retired Army General Lucius D. Clay, commander of U.S. forces in Europe during the 1948-49 Berlin airlift.

West Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was on hand at the airport near Bonn where Johnson's Air Force jet settled down. The Vice President, standing erect in the misty rain, spoke there briefly of his mission ("The American President and the American people are determined to fulfill our obligations and honor all our commitments") before driving into the West German capital for further talks with Adenauer. Then he flew on to Berlin.

"Time for Faith." Cheering crowds lined the streets as he drove through the beleaguered city with Mayor Willy Brandt, but only a handful of Berliners were visible when his car turned down Potsdamerstrasse, a street that led straight to the Eastern zone. Nearing the border, Lyndon's Cadillac stopped; East German soldiers looked on unblinkingly as the Vice President, who stayed in the car on State Department advice, surveyed the illegal barrier set up by the Communist world. Later, Johnson addressed Berlin's House of Representatives, drew an ocean of applause for his speech. "This is a time for confidence, for poise, and for faith--for faith in yourselves." he said. "It is also a time for faith in your allies, everywhere throughout the world. This island does not stand alone."

At week's end, after a period of reflection that seemed close to indecision, the U.S. was finally showing that its promises to defend Berlin's independence were not confined to diplomatic paper. Yet, despite the troop movement and despite Johnson's presence, there was still a danger that Khrushchev might mistake the earlier Western surprise for Western weakness. There was no question that the Communist world had lost considerable face by its blatant, brutal effort to keep its own citizens behind the Iron Curtain. But the practical effect of the Communists' illegal fait accompli was a diminution of the West's position in Berlin.

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