Capability v. Credibility

Maine Republican Margaret Chase Smith does not speak often on the floor of the U.S. Senate--but when she does, she is generally worth listening to. Last week Maggie Smith arose to deliver what she plainly considered to be one of the most important speeches of her life. The result: a criticism, all the more scathing for its unpartisan sincerity, of the Kennedy Administration's cold war policies.

The U.S., said Maine's Smith, a ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has "a decided nuclear capability advantage over Khrushchev--and he knows it. Otherwise he wouldn't have resumed nuclear tests. But he is confident we won't use it, for he sees us turning to emphasis on conventional weapons--and ironically, he has an obviously great superiority in conventional weapons and manpower over us. We have in effect played into his hands--for the kind of warfare in which he knows he can beat us. We have restricted ourselves on the freedom of choice to use the nuclear tactical weapons which he knows would defeat him if he started war.

"We have the nuclear capability, and he knows and fears it. But we have practically told him we do not have the will to use that one power with which we can stop him. We have the nuclear capability--but not the nuclear credibility."

To Maggie Smith, the question of U.S. will is crucial in the cold war: "If today, and in the days immediately ahead, we fail to meet the Soviets at the ultimate levels of will and purpose, the danger will be greatly widened that we will have no choice later on but to meet them at the ultimate levels of force and violence--either that or submit to their will. How much farther do you think Khrushchev would go if he was confident the over-all military advantage was on his side?"

Addressing herself directly to President Kennedy, Mrs. Smith said she had been deeply impressed by his "brave and inspiring words" about both Cuba and Laos. But, she continued, the President's performance had not lived up to his words. "Mr. President," she cried, "brave words are fine--but action speaks louder than words and deters Khrushchev more...I cannot know what Khrushchev thinks, what it is that influences him, what he looks for when he makes his judgments. But I fervently hope that he would not make his final assessment as to our will and purpose in Berlin on the basis of what he has seen and deduced from, for example, Laos and Cuba. God forbid that the pattern of brave words on Laos and Cuba, followed by no brave action, be repeated in Berlin."

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