Friday, Oct. 27, 1961
Strength in Disunity
In Moscow last week, Nikita Khrushchev not only waved his 50-megaton bomb and derided capitalism; he also crowed about "disunity" among the Western Allies. "Major contradictions divide the U.S.A. and Britain and other imperialist states," he said. "They appear both in NATO and in other aggressive blocs."
Khrushchev had a point--of sorts. There are indeed differences among the U.S., Britain, France and West Germany. They have been there for years, ruffling the sensitivities of statesmen and furnishing fodder for cartoonists. In the past they have concerned contributions to NATO, or arguments over colonialism or summitry or economic cooperation. But the alliance has stood for quite a while, and it remains steadfast. Today, the differences center on the problem of Germany and negotiations over Berlin.
As of last week, the positions of the Allies were about as follows:
sbWEST GERMANY. Of all the Allies. West Germany has the most vital interests at stake--and Bonn is fearful that Britain and the U.S. are too eager to enter into East-West negotiations that might end with the West trading away basic German rights. While he does not rule out the possibility of negotiations. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer is far from eager for them to begin. Adenauer is determined not to accept any settlement that might shatter Germany's hopes for eventual reunification. He hopes to visit President Kennedy in Washington as soon as his Cabinet crisis is resolved. Meanwhile, last week he sent Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe to Washington with orders to pass on some of the specifics of the German stand. Items: Bonn cannot extend de facto recognition to East Germany, although it is willing, under certain conditions, to talk to East Germany about arrangements for an all-German election. West Germany cannot accept any formalization of the Oder-Neisse line between East Germany and Poland, any project for disengagement in Central Europe, any plan for Germany as a non-nuclear zone.
sbFRANCE. President de Gaulle stands with Adenauer in his reluctance to rush into negotiations. Last week he ordered the withdrawal of France from a planned London meeting of Allied representatives to discuss Germany's future; his decision caused the cancellation of the sessions. De Gaulle feels strongly that the West must not allow itself to be threatened into negotiations by Khrushchev. De Gaulle himself has long ago conceded the Oder-Neisse line, and France at best pays only lip service to German reunification. De Gaulle's emphasis is on the maintenance of present Allied rights in West Germany and Berlin. He stands staunch against any sort of disengagement in Central Europe. against German troop limitations, and recognition of East Germany.
sbGREAT BRITAIN. Among the Allies. Britain is the most eager to get started on negotiations. Britain was angered by De Gaulle's decision not to participate in the London talks, and Foreign Secretary Lord Home expressed his feelings to French Ambassador Jean Chauvel in strong terms. The British argue that substantive concessions can be won from the Soviet Union at the negotiating table, and they point to Khrushchev's changed timetable for an East German treaty as evidence. In further negotiations, Britain might be willing to offer de facto recognition to East Germany and to accept the Oder-Neisse line as a permanent division. But Britain has shown no sign of abandoning its insistence on the eventual reunification of Germany.
sbTHE U.S. President Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk are less anxious than Britain's leaders to enter into actual negotiations. But they are determined to keep open the diplomatic routes leading toward them, and to continue their exploration of what negotiations might achieve. Says Rusk: "Nothing can be gained by being out of contact." Both Kennedy and Rusk would like to broaden any Germany negotiations into discussions covering the whole subject of European security. Although the Administration insists on maintaining the Allied rights of access to and presence in Berlin, and on guarantees for Berlin as a free and economically viable part of West Germany, it has not yet completely ruled out the possibilities of a fully inspected troop thin-out or some sort of non-nuclear zone.
Pondering such differences in his more frustrated moments. President Kennedy has been heard to exclaim: "God save us from our friends." Unquestionably, the leaders of the other Allied nations have at times felt the same way about the U.S. and about each other--for controversy is basic in the nature of any alliance composed of free nations and dedicated to free discussion. Each of the Western Allies has its own ideas, its own problems, its own ambitions. In the conflicts that have arisen before the Berlin crisis, the Allies have always managed, despite occasional harsh words, to iron out their differences before they became critical --and that, precisely, is the point. As well as any alliance in human history, the Western Allies have realized that politics does not stop at the water's edge, that the national interests of the one must be accommodated to the national interests of all. Although the arguments about Germany were making headlines last week, the fact was that the Allies' positions on Germany were closer than at any time in months, and there was no longer any substantive reason for fearing that German freedom might be traded for a troublous, temporary peace. Russia's Khrushchev would do well to understand that if he ever does start the shooting over Berlin, Western differences will be forgotten and the Allies will be standing together. Khrushchev would be lucky if he could say the same of his own, bullet-enforced Communist alliance.
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