What the People Say

Some observers on the spot have gloomily concluded that the war to save strategic South Viet Nam from the Communist Viet Cong guerrillas cannot be won under President Ngo Dinh Diem, despite his promises to reform his rigid, often corrupt regime. The critics have no alternatives to offer, and the U.S. is still backing Diem full force, but there is a growing discussion of the case against him.

So far the U.S. has given Diem $2 billion in economic and military aid. Since last fall, the buildup has included 56 large helicopters. The U.S. now has 3,600 men in South Viet Nam, piloting planes, tending war dogs used for combat patrols, training Diem's 170,000-man army in anti-guerrilla tactics. Ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet patrol the South China Sea to prevent Red infiltration by junk and sampan. U.S. special forces are on the way to beef up Diem's military intelligence, communications and logistics.

On paper, this should be enough to dispose of the estimated 20,000 Viet Cong guerrillas. But Diem's critics cite his unwillingness to delegate authority, the inefficiency of his administration, the low morale of his officer corps. The charge most often made is that President Diem is alienated from the 14 million people of South Viet Nam. Says a U.S. officer in Saigon: "This country is less a battlefield than a political arena. No matter how much military help the U.S. pours in, the war cannot be won without the support of the people."

To hear something of the people's feelings, TIME Correspondent Jerry Rose went on a three-week tour of the farms and villages, from the canal-laced Mekong delta to the lowland jungles of Darlac to the sagebrush plains of Pleiku. His report:

For 20 years the Vietnamese peasant has been ordered about, brutalized or wooed by soldiers--French, Japanese, Communist Viet Minh. Now, he is once more caught in the middle, between the Communist Viet Cong guerrillas and Diem's army. Squatting in the shade of his oxcart, a farmer north of Saigon said wearily: "Many times we are forced by the Viet Cong to spend the night digging ditches across the road. In the morning we are forced by the army to fill in the holes. The next night, we must dig them again."

The Red Appeal. The peasants refer to both the Diem government and the Communists as they, as if recognizing that a peasant cannot be a participant in the war, only a victim. But even the most isolated tribesmen must choose to which of them he wants to give his allegiance. Typical of the Reds' recruiting and propaganda is one of their recent forays among the Jarai tribe of the central plateau. More than 100 Viet Cong arrived one night, lit a bonfire and assembled the people. "A Communist spoke for 30 or 40 minutes," reported a tribesman. "He spoke Jarai, just like us. He told us that his men would soon be masters of the South, that the French left the country to them. 'And when we are masters,' he said, 'you can have everything in the jungle. All the fish. All the meat.' "

Communist agents are now making a circuit of the villages touting their new "Ten-Point Program," which soft-pedals Marxism, includes such features as general elections and the unification of South and North Viet Nam, freedom for all political parties, release of all political prisoners, promotion of "free enterprise," and creation of a neutral Southeast Asian bloc that would accept aid from all nations, including the U.S. By no means do all the peasants fall for the Red promises. Says one in pidgin French: "Moi pas vu, moi pas croire" (Me no see, me no believe). But a great many others are convinced by the Reds, partly because, as one villager says, "The Viet Cong come into the fields and work with you. If there's no work to be done, they'll even wash out your rice bowl for you." Added another peasant in the delta: "The Viet Cong live like us, look like us, share our homes. How can we inform on them?"

But in their nearness, the Communists can hurt, too, and draw much of their support from fear. "You must not commit a crime against the Viet Cong," says one villager. "If you give information to the army, they will kill you and pin the verdict to your shirt." Another added, "They know when you leave the village and where you're going and when you come home. We fear them more than the government."

The Government Role. Feared or not, the government seems much farther away than the Reds. On the central plateau, a peasant said that President Diem had been in his district: "Mr. Government went through here once with many soldiers around him, but I couldn't see his face." Yet the absence of the army is most often counted a blessing. When troops arrive, they check identity papers, impose curfews, arrest people suspected of helping the Reds. And when the army opens a local offensive against the guerrillas, who infiltrate everywhere, its fire is bound to be indiscriminate. "I think the Viet Cong have done many wrong things," said one delta peasant, "but we dread the cannon shells of the army because they fall anywhere."

The government has armed many villagers to fight the Reds, but this has its hazards. Many desert to the Viet Cong. Others, with guns in their hands, become thieves: "As soon as one gets a rifle, he can rob any house he wants--and his whole family gets rich." But some of these village militiamen turn into heroes. "Many times, they have saved our village," declared a grateful farmer. "They stand guard all night and part of the day. They have no time for their own work and don't get paid enough. But they still protect us."

The U.S. Presence. American aid has supplied South Viet Nam with roads, factories, universities, even with an atomic reactor. But very little dribbles down to the peasant, who wants education for his children, medical care, agricultural aid, honest officials and, most of all, protection. On a farm in a coastal region, a mother explained the neglect of her scab-ridden year-old son. "It costs 14-c- to go to the village and 14-c- to come back. The doctor charges 70-c- and then I must buy medicine. We're too poor."

The peasants of Binhdinh province say the rats this year are thick as a man's leg from eating the crops. Is there no rat poison available? Yes, there is the kind sold by the government for $1.65 a lb., but it seems to make the rats fatter and healthier. A better poison is sold by merchants for $3 a lb.--too expensive. Actually, both are the same--but the one poison has been diluted to ineffectiveness by government officials who sell the real thing on the black market.

A U.S.-built highway runs west from Quinhon, but at one village, where the road cuts across a field, the drainage pipe was placed too high. Thus one side of the road is drowned while the other is parched, ruining 24 acres of the village's skimpy fields. The peasants are certain that the Americans would fix the pipe if they knew about it. But how does a peasant reach the Americans? Who would listen to him?

Thousands of farmers have been resettled by the government in the high plateau province of Pleiku. Generally they agree that conditions are better than in their old homes. But a local supervisor says bluntly, "Their rice and cash allotments are being stolen by the regional authorities. The wood they cut is confiscated by officials who sell it and pocket the money. The fertilizer they are supposed to get goes to the black market."

At bottom, who are the peasants for? Said one, earnestly: "A government is like an adopted father. If there is not enough to eat, the son may quarrel with one father and find another." In Quangnam province, a black-clad villager rolled a cigarette. "Our heart is for the government that takes the least and gives the people happiness and abundance," said he. "We have not yet found that government."

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.