De Gaulle's Next Tasks for France

In the four years since he came to power, Charles de Gaulle has bent the bulk of his energies toward solving the Algerian problem. Never humble, even in adversity, De Gaulle will not yield to the reasoning of his opponents "that if he succeeds in Algeria, he will no longer be necessary." Instead, the French people will be reminded of their debt to the man who might adapt Louis XIV's reputed maxim to read La nation, c'est moi.

Rightists call him a deceiver who sold France out to those same "ambitious agitators" with whom he swore he would never negotiate; leftists say that he negotiated too slowly and too deviously, hold him responsible for much of the S.A.O. violence in France and Algeria. But whatever the detours, only Charles de Gaulle had the stature to steer France toward a settlement without civil war. Drawing on his surge of popularity after a settlement, De Gaulle will put the terms of the Evian accord to the nation in a national referendum, probably in the spring, then will call for parliamentary elections to strengthen his hand in the National Assembly so that eventually he can push through constitutional reforms. Members of the Gaullist U.N.R. (Union for the New Republic) have asked that the referendum and the elections be held at the same time so that they can cash in on the electoral profits of the Algerian peace. But De Gaulle has demurred. With an overwhelming 85% of the voters sure to vote for the settlement, he does not want the referendum clouded by any other issue.

- Except for the Communists, no faction really wanted a serious government crisis before De Gaulle either won or definitely lost his Algerian gamble. But now France is once again open to the backbiting kind of party politicking that De Gaulle despises ("How can you govern a country that has 227 different varieties of cheeses?" he once contemptuously asked).

Typically, De Gaulle will not endorse any single party in the next elections, will instead make a grand and ambiguous appeal for the election of those who support Gaullist policy and French glory. Despite De Gaulle's popularity, the Gaullist U.N.R. stands to lose many of its 207 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The Algerie Franc,aise wing of the party will defect, and 26 U.N.R. Deputies from Algerian constituencies will disappear with independence. The Communists may gain seats by arguing that they had been for an Algerian settlement before anyone else.

Since no party stands to win a clear majority, De Gaulle's prestige is still the most potent political force in France. If opposition groupings should get too strong, he can threaten to dissolve the National Assembly and take any issue to the nation. One such issue may well be his plan to revise the constitution to provide for the direct popular election of a President.

(Under the present constitution, a President is elected by some 80,000 electors.) Purpose of the proposed reform is not to create a U.S.-model presidency, but to put the French presidency above the chaos of party politics. Says De Gaulle: "The President must never be the leader of a parliamentary majority." - Also in the cards is a Cabinet shuffle. Major anticipated casualty is waspish little Premier Michel Debre. Cool to NATO and (until called upon to implement De Gaulle's policy) against Algerian independence. Debre has been the lightning rod of the Gaullist regime, attracting resentment that might otherwise have been showered on De Gaulle. Into the Foreign Ministry replacing Maurice Couve de Murville will probably go Algerian Affairs Minister Louis Joxe, now De Gaulle's most trusted adviser. It is on foreign policy that De Gaulle will concentrate his attention. To De Gaulle the settlement of the Algerian problem was never an end in itself, but the prerequisite for the major Gaullist objective: the restoration of France as a great power. Toward this end, De Gaulle is pressing on two fronts. He is determined to develop France's primitive nuclear capacity, to make France the dominant voice in the European Common Market. De Gaulle regards a supranational European union as an abomination, hopes instead for a confederation of European states, each with a veto over policies it does not like. Already foreign ambassadors posted to Paris have warned their governments that an Algerian settlement means a tougher, not a more tractable De Gaulle.

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