Hero by Accident

A triumphal arc of laurel branches spanned the main street of the west Algerian city of Tiaret. In the reviewing stand, dissident Vice Premier Ahmed ben Bella listened to the cheers of thousands of Moslem women chanting Yu! Yu! Yu!, then settled back to listen to a round of speeches from his top aides, attempting to justify his bid to overthrow the government of Premier Benyoussef Benkhedda. Just as one speaker assured the crowd that "Algeria is not the Congo," a messenger passed word to the assembled dignitaries that perhaps it really was. Some 320 miles to the east, at Constantine, Algerians had fired on Algerians; soldiers supporting Ben Bella wrested control of the city from government troops and arrested a government Cabinet minister.

Algeria is certainly not the Congo, but last week, independent less than a month, it bore a definite outward resemblance. In cities and towns, in mountain fortresses and sun-baked desert camps, feuding factions waged a struggle for control. Government was paralyzed and more Europeans were getting out. With industry at a standstill, the U.S., working through church welfare agencies, was feeding one out of five Algerians. What saved Algeria from complete disintegration was a modicum of political maturity and an instinct for survival that made the rival forces at least halfway willing to explore compromises. Emerging from these maneuvers was the near certainty that Ahmed ben Bella, 45, would win his battle "to take over the destiny of Algeria."

Ben Bella is a hero almost by accident. He has no clear ideology, but a talent for ringing phrases, no strong political organization, but considerable political flair. He often seems unsure of himself, but can also be arrogant and tough. Born of simple country parents in the west Algerian town of Marnia, he served as a master sergeant in the French army in World War II, became a terrorist for the Algerian nationalists, was one of the nine founders of the F.L.N. Captured by the French in 1956, he was imprisoned for the next 5 1/2 years. That was a rare stroke of good fortune, for it built Ben Bella up as a martyred exile in the eyes of the Algerian people. Unlike the Algerian leaders who led the war and negotiated the peace with France, Ben Bella remained uncontaminated by either the factional squabbling within the F.L.N. or by the necessity to compromise with the French.

The Gates of Hell. Ben Bella began last week's days of crisis late Sunday evening with the announcement from his headquarters at Tlemcen, near the Moroccan border, that he had formed a seven-man politburo that would oust the "usurpers" of the provisional government (G.P.R.A.) from power and run the country until the formation of a constituent assembly. Premier Benkhedda was specifically excluded from the politburo, and only two members of his government (Ait Akhmed and Mohammed Boudiaf) were in; the rest were all Ben Bella men. Meanwhile, the military forces loyal to Ben Bella solidified control in the wilayas (zones) of both western and eastern Algeria.

Next day. Premier Benkhedda caved in and accepted the authority of the new politburo. Though Ben Bella was still 285 miles away in Tlemcen, Benkhedda's Cabinet ministers began to flee Algiers, leaving Benkhedda holed up in the Palais d'Ete, guarded by a company of loyal soldiers. (Toward week's end, the ministers shamefacedly began to slink back into the city; one sneaked upstairs to his quarters in the Hotel Aletti through the back door.) Two government ministers, however, left Algiers not in flight but ostensibly to fight. Tough, able Belkacem Krim, who conducted the F.L.N.'s peace negotiations with the French, and shrewd, ambitious Mohammed Boudiaf, a onetime jailmate and implacable foe of Ben Bella's, set up headquarters in the rugged, all but impenetrable Kabylia area and vowed to resist Ben Bella's takeover "to the last drop of blood."

Momentarily Ben Bella's drive seemed stalled; Kabylia's mountain passes, known as "The Gates of Hell," command the roads to Algiers, and a determined defense could easily thwart a Ben Bella military operation to take over the capital.

No Brink. Amid rumors that 30 people had been killed in the takeover of Constantine, public opinion temporarily began to turn away from Ben Bella. Though no outside newsmen had been in Constantine, reporters filed stories that Algeria was "teetering on the brink of civil war." Down from Paris flew a whole new contingent of correspondents, searching in vain for the war. Almost triumphantly, Ben Bella annouced that actually fewer than five people had been killed in the Constantine "skirmish." To show his good faith, Ben Bella ordered the release of the Cabinet minister his forces had captured.

Ben Bella sent his most trusted lieutenant, Mohammed Khidder, to Algiers to work out a peaceful takeover agreement with Benkhedda. His forces continued to fan out over the country, however, took control of the important east Algeria seaport of Philippeville. Unexpectedly Krim also showed up in Algiers, speaking more mellowly; he would not attack the Ben Bella forces, he said, would only resist any invasion of the Kabylia.

Presumably Ben Bella has no such "invasion" in mind, being well aware that whoever starts a civil war at this moment of victory might win an initial battle, but will be discredited in the eyes of war-weary Moslems.

Marxist Patter. Personal power more than principle is what is at stake. To see the conflict as a conservative Benkhedda v. leftist Ben Bella is to make it too simple. Ben Bella's support ranges from conservative ex-Premier Ferhat Abbas to Red-leaning Colonel Houari Boumedienne, former army Chief of Staff, whose firing by Benkhedda in June precipitated the split between the warring chiefs. Benkhedda himself reached power as an activist leftist. Ben Bella's army support comes from the military chiefs in the wilayas, who during the war won a certain amount of autonomy, and are reluctant to give it up to Benkhedda's Provisional Government. To reassert their voice, they have banded behind Ben Bella in his takeover bid, but they are perfectly capable of trying to shunt him aside too, should he attempt to exercise authority over them as did Benkhedda. Ben Bella's chief lever is his charismatic popularity with the masses; his power to maintain order is still an unknown quantity.

Ben Bella's real political convictions, if any, are hard to determine. His Marxist patter--one-party rule, socialization of agriculture and industry, neutralism in foreign affairs--is not very different from that used by many other Middle Eastern and African leaders. So far there is no evidence that he is a Communist--but he could well become a Communist tool. Like the other neutralists, he is quite willing to accept aid from the West, but wants stronger ties with the Soviet bloc. He has condemned the moderates' desire for cooperation with France. He is also a strong supporter of pan-Arabism, is even seen by some as a potential rival of his onetime benefactor, Nasser. Ben Bella, in his speeches, chants: "We are Arabs, we are Arabs, we are Arabs." His supporters claim that the ex-country boy, the ex-terrorist, the ex-noncom, the ex-prisoner is most interested in helping Algeria's fellahin. Just how to do it, Ben Bella has obviously not yet figured out.

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