Beyond Buckles & Bloomers

The interservice dispute waxed hot. The Air Force argued for 1 1/4 in. The Marines insisted upon 2 3/8 in.--and at that the Navy balked. Only the Army seemed agreeable to any specification. The services met, disagreed, kicked the question upstairs to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. Infuriated, McNamara ignored the services, resolved the issue with a swift decision of his own: officers' shirt collars must be 1/2 in. high.

To McNamara, the collar controversy in the fall of 1961 was the last straw in decades of squabbling over how to get the services together on their supply purchases --a $3 billion annual business that involves everything from toilet tissue to electronic computers. Within weeks of the fight over collars, McNamara ordered the creation of a unified Defense Supply Agency with a difficult mission: "To improve supply support to the operating forces while materially reducing the cost to the taxpayer." Now a year old, the agency has already saved millions, proved itself invaluable in the Cuba crisis, and given a strong indication that armed forces unification really can work.

Why Black? At the head of the Defense Supply Agency is Lieut. General Andrew McNamara (no kin), former Army Quartermaster General, who was called home from his post as deputy commander of the Eighth Army in Korea to direct the agency. McNamara operates on the theory that the customer is not always right. When the Army and Navy wanted to standardize on a 12-c- brass belt buckle, the Air Force wanted silver and the Marines sought a 29-c- open-face buckle. General McNamara finally said it would be a 12-c- item -- and black. "But why black? No one asked for black," complained one service aide. "Who the hell asked you?" replied McNamara. "You wanted a decision and you got it." He still wears the first black buckle issued.

After that, the battle of the bloomers was a cinch. The WAVES and WAFS wanted their exercise uniforms blue, the WACS and Lady Marines preferred taupe. The general ruled that color was no functional factor, decreed that all must wear blue--and thereby saved $115,000. Beyond tussling with buckles and bloomers, however, the new agency effected some notable economies in military procurement. Examples:

> By slashing some 15,000 items from the armed forces supply inventory, it saved $230 million.

> With centralized administration, it cut $30 million off what the individual services had estimated it would cost them to administer their supply programs in fiscal 1963.

> By purchasing aircraft cleaning compound in bulk instead of in small containers it saved $1,300.000.

> By consolidating individual Marine and Army textile plants in Philadelphia, it saved $1,500,000 on overhead alone. -- By deciding that servicemen can eat ordinary soda crackers instead of those meeting precise "military specifications," it saved $93,000 on each 1.5 million lbs. purchased.

Loading the Ships. If doubts about the Defense Supply Agency still remained, the Cuba crisis erased them. In a frantic four weeks the agency handled some 40,000 requisitions daily, delivered some 90% of them in the time requested. Its Richmond, Va.. field center was asked for 38,000 cots, had them on their way to Florida overnight. Its Philadelphia clothing center dispatched 55,000 camouflage coverings for helmets. Some 850,000 yds. of parachute webbing moved swiftly to Memphis and Fort Bragg. Out of New York, the agency sent 1,000,000 Ibs. of frozen food to deployed naval units, stocked the ships on Cuba patrol with 45 days' worth of supplies. In one week 350,000 ft. of Kodak photo-reconnaissance film sped to Navy and Air Force flyers. The agency summoned 50 railroad presidents to Washington, got agreement on permanent boxcar rates on military cargo, rather than time-consuming itemizing.

Despite such accomplishments, neither of the McNamaras is content. The agency still is hammering at interservice jealousies, is seeking standardization of some 100,000 missile parts, is wrestling with the burgeoning problem of spare electronics parts. But supply unification obviously does work--and congressional committees can no longer point to one service that orders $77 million worth of a radio receiver that another service is stocking in huge surplus. As bureaucracy goes, that is progress.

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