Victory for Goulart

From the sun-soaked beaches of Copacabana to the rain-drenched upper reaches of the Amazon, more than 10 million Brazilians went to the polls to vote on how powerful the country's presidency should be. In September 1961, after Janio Quadros' petulant resignation and flight, Brazil's conservatives had imposed a power-splitting parliamentary system as a condition for accepting Quadros' successor, Vice President Joao ("Jango") Goulart, whom they feared as a dangerous demagogue and leftist. Last week by a 5-to-1 margin, Brazilians rendered a vote of no confidence in the parliamentary system and ordered a return to a strong presidency.

Clear to All. Goulart campaigned against parliamentary government from the moment he took office, and did not knock himself out trying to make the system work. Responsibility for running the country was transferred to Congress, the Cabinet and the Prime Minister. But congressional leaders engaged in endless political bickering, while Brazil's inflation, already severe, grew worse. Prime Minister followed Prime Minister and new U.S. investment, frightened by the instability, dropped from $266 million in 1961 to $62 million last year. Not until last September, when they were thoroughly frightened by threats of a pro-Goulart military coup, did the Congressmen reluctantly agree to the plebiscite that Goulart wanted.

A few days before the balloting Goulart was so convinced that he would win that he described his plans for the future, once power was his, to TIME Correspondent John Blashill. In need of a shave, with his tie loosened, Goulart talked aboard his government-provided Viscount as he flew from Rio to Brasilia.

"Brazil can be the anti-Cuba, the democratic example of economic emancipation for Latin America to follow," he said. "If Brazil, with its enormous resources and its growing industry, can't do it, no other Latin American country can." Admittedly, continued Goulart, "it is very hard to carry out an economic program during a great political crisis." But a three-year economic plan had been drawn up for him, and it was, he said, "neither revolutionary nor Marxist. It gives great incentive to free enterprise--and great responsibilities."

Vargas & the Workers. Such moderate talk sounded odd from a man. now 44, who learned his politics at the feet of Getulio Vargas, Brazil's master demagogue. In the middle 19405, Goulart marked himself as a man to watch in the Brazilian Labor Party. As Vargas' Labor Minister in 1953, Goulart spent his time approving one wage boost after another. Finally, when he proposed a 100% wage hike for all workers, conservatives complained so strongly that Vargas fired him.

But by then Goulart was strong enough to go it alone.

In the 1955 elections he won more votes for the vice-presidency than Juscelino Kubitschek won for the presidency (Brazilians vote separately for President and Vice President). Once again Goulart was given control of the crowd-pleasing ministries--Labor and Agriculture. In the 1960 election campaign, arguing for the nationalization of power companies, foreign banks and meat-packing houses, he won the vice-presidency for a second time.

"The U.S. Must Help." Goulart's leftist labor allies still attack foreign businessmen, and Brazil's government still pursues its let's-be-nice-to-Communism foreign policy. Only a month ago. President Kennedy sent his brother Bobby to Brasilia to tell Goulart in no uncertain terms that the U.S. could not forever continue to support a nation seemingly unable to help itself out of political and economic chaos. The message seems to have gone home. In economics, at least, Goulart talks like a man trying to control Brazil's reckless course.

Goulart's three-year economic program was drafted by Celso Furtado. 42, the economist responsible for creating an admirable development plan for the blighted, Communist-target states of the northeastern Atlantic bulge. Furtado projects a 7% annual rise in Brazil's gross national product. If all goes well, manufacturing is to grow by 11.2% annually, transport facilities by 8.8%, agricultural production by 5.7%. The program will require a $4 billion investment between now and 1965, of which private industry is expected to put up two-thirds, the government one-third.

Under Furtado's plan, Brazil intends to help itself by slashing internal budget deficits; taxes will be increased, government expenditures will be reduced, subsidies on consumer goods will be eliminated. But Brazil will still need massive help from abroad, and for that, of course, it looks to the U.S.

"The U.S. must help us, in its own interests," Goulart says. "Brazil isn't Cuba, but if it ever became another Cuba, it would be a more dangerous one." The point is well understood in Washington. Heartened by Goulart's new signs of responding seriously to his country's problems, the U.S. announced an emergency $30 million credit to tide Brazil over the first three months of 1963.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.