A Problem of Personality

Western Europe last week made it abundantly clear to France's Charles de Gaulle that his arrogant scheme to stamp Europe's unity movement with his own pattern of a French-led continent is not going to work. As delegates gathered in confusion in Brussels for another effort to squeeze Britain into the Common Market despite De Gaulle's haughty non, the outcry against the grandiose dreams of le grand Charles echoed in every Western capital.

Belgium's Senate passed a unanimous resolution condemning French intransigence and demanding that talks with Britain be resumed. "A diktat" roared Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak of De Gaulle's presumption to act as all Europe's spokesman. "Our problem is the personality of General de Gaulle. We are not only against his methods but also against his reasons, which are false." If Britain is left out, declared Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, "the idea of a united Europe will be in crisis." Italy's Premier Amintore Fanfani called it a menace to NATO itself.

Unthinkable Europe. When West Germany's 87-year-old Chancellor Konrad Adenauer returned to Bonn after signing the Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation in Paris, he got jeers instead of cheers for kowtowing to France's leader. Angry headlines lashed his failure to hold out for Britain's Common Market entry as part of the bargain; and, what was worse, the Bonn Cabinet itself promptly slapped der Alte with a unanimous vote to support the British in Brussels. "Europe without Britain is unthinkable," declared Vice Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, leader of the West German Common Market delegation. From the Bundestag came strong warnings that legislators will refuse to ratify Adenauer's pact unless De Gaulle's selfish whim is thwarted.

Not very many Germans or very many other Europeans could be happy with the grandiose task Charles de Gaulle had set himself. In the long run, it was creation of a Gaullist third force in the great-powers equation. En route, he was rejecting supranational Europe, brushing aside the proposed multilateral nuclear deterrent to preserve total weapons sovereignty for himself, rebuffing Britain for frankly selfish political reasons, and, in fact, rejecting the whole Atlantic Community concept with its overtones of American participation. It was perhaps the U.S. voice in Europe that De Gaulle feared most. He was even preparing to control the influx of American capital into France with tight new financial regulations (see WORLD BUSINESS). "This Europe that Monsieur Luns and Monsieur Spaak want," sneered a Gaullist Deputy, "this Europe patronized by American generals and General Motors."

Pasta & Fiats. As the waves of criticism rolled over him, De Gaulle loftily dismissed suggestions that his proposals might break up the entire Common Market scheme. "Nobody will quit the Common Market," he sniffed at a reception for members of the French Parlia ment. "Italy, for example. We send her iron and coal, and we buy her pasta and Fiats. She's very happy." As for Britain, he snapped contemptuously, "Britain has given back to America what atomic force she had. She could just as well have turned it over to Europe. Well, she's chosen."

During the uproar, the British government refrained from throwing more oil on the fire. In a major speech at Liverpool, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan answered the Gaullist criticism that Britain had "special ties" with the U.S. and the Commonwealth by pointing out that France also retained special ties with its former colonies. He argued cogently that in the second half of this century no one free nation could seek to dominate other free nations, adding: "Nor can any country in these days stand entirely on its own. Alliances are essential to security." Britain would continue the patient struggle to win a place in Europe, said Harold Macmillan. Its Common Market negotiator Edward Heath was already back in Brussels, ready to take his seat at the negotiating table.

Common English. Neither Britain nor any other European nation had a basic objection to the sight of France and Germany burying the hatchet after generations of enmity. But it seemed a futile gesture at best; the Common Market itself seemed sufficient means to weld the two old foes in common cause. In any case, the treaty, which pledges both governments to cooperation in defense, foreign policy, education and youth affairs, seems more sentimental than serious. Asked what precisely the treaty added to existing Franco-German ties, a top French official said vaguely, "It depends on what develops." Skeptical newsmen joked that it was a "treaty to come to dinner," and noted the irony in the fact that when the Defense Ministers of France and West Germany sat down to talk, the only language they had in common was English.

Looking Out. The U.S. made no secret of its stand on the Common Market. In Washington, President Kennedy asked: "What kind of a Europe do they want? Do they want one looking out or looking in? What do they see as the balance of forces in the world today?" He underlined the "peculiar logic" of De Gaulle, which sees Britain and the U.S. as enemies, when "the reality of the danger is that all free men and nations live under the constant threat of the Communist advance." U.S. concern, Kennedy conceded, was not totally unselfish. Washington hopes that British membership in the Common Market will help build a united Europe that can share with the U.S. the burden of solving the problems of the world's have-not nations.

In Manhattan to receive an award from Freedom House, France's Jean Monnet, the father of the Common Market, took direct issue with De Gaulle. "Entry into Europe would be good for Britain, for Europe, for the West and for world peace," he declared. "There are urgent problems which neither Europe nor America can settle alone. These are, to my mind, the monetary stability of the West, the organization of agriculture in an increasingly industrial world, help to the developing countries to speed their growth, and of course, the freeing of trade to be negotiated between yourselves and the Common Market."

Old Principle. As for U.S. intentions, viewed with such suspicion in Paris, Monnet reminded De Gaulle that ever since the 1947 Marshall Plan, the U.S. has worked for European union: "For once, the most powerful country in the world has helped others to unite instead of adopting the old principle of divide and rule."

Next move in the struggle is clearly up to France. Some observers took heart from the fact that even in his most infuriating and didactic speeches, De Gaulle usually leaves himself a loophole for retreat if pressures grow too great. They also recall that le grand Charles does not always mean everything he says, e.g., after solemnly assuring his people that Algeria was forever French, De Gaulle then be came an instrument in securing Algerian independence. At week's end, surrounded by rebellious Common Market partners, facing a determined Britain, and a U.S. that is preparing to establish a NATO-controlled nuclear deterrent with or with out the French, De Gaulle perhaps would have to begin thinking of a better way to express the grandeur of France.

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