In an Era of Self-Interest

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Many of the U.S.'s old friends do not seem to call as often as they used to--and when they do, there is apt to be a new tone of voice. By design and by drift, they follow increasingly independent courses, with less and less reference to U.S. policy. Sometimes they almost seem to defy U.S. wishes out of pure perversity.

What has happened? There is, of course, no single turning point for such a trend. With massive U.S. help, the economies of most free-world countries have been immensely strengthened, thereby increasing their sense of independence. At the same time, troubles behind the Iron Curtain forced Russia to relax some of its old, cold-war positions. Then, last August, came the signing of the test-ban treaty, which put a big exclamation point after the fact that the cold war was no longer the same cold war, in which everyone knew the rules. While the basic issues of that war remain, and the U.S. denies that there is a real detente, the pressures that bound free nations together for mutual self-protection no longer seem so great. Says Brazil's Foreign Minister Joao Augusto de Araujo Castro, whose own nation has caused the U.S. any number of headaches: "With the marked relaxation in world af fairs, the rules of the international game are changing--no doubt of it."

Under the new rules, almost all countries seem to feel free to pursue their own nationalistic interests, with only a nod now and then to the obligations of alliance.

The Disaffections. France is the most obvious--and dramatic--example. In seeking to regain the glory that was France, Charles de Gaulle has refused to sign the test-ban treaty, rejected the U.S. plan for a multilateral nuclear force in Europe, kept Britain out of the Common Market, undermined the U.S. effort in South Viet Nam by arguing that the country should be neutralized, recognized Red China. Last week he tipped three more bowls of hot porridge into the U.S. lap. In a single busy day, France moved toward a major new economic agreement with Russia, hinted that it might torpedo U.S.-supported tariff talks in Geneva this spring, made it clear that it will support the admission of Red China to the United Nations. Beyond all that, De Gaulle hopes to increase French influence in Latin America, where he plans to visit Mexico this month and several other countries in the fall (see THE HEMISPHERE). Says a French diplomat: "This will give our Latin friends a choice other than American or Communist influence."

But France is by no means alone in running counter to U.S. policy. Britain insists on trading with Castro's Cuba, scoffs at the U.S. embargo. Says a British diplomat: "You have a Cuban neurosis, and we can't be expected to adhere to your policy while you trade with the Soviet Union." Portugal has declared that treaties granting the U.S. bases in the Azores "should be rediscussed," also hints that it may recognize Communist China. Greek demonstrators, enraged over U.S. policy toward Cyprus, last week burned President Johnson in effigy, waved signs showing him in a Turkish fez, shouted "Bravo, Russia!"

In the Middle East, even such staunch friends as the Shah of Iran and Jordan's King Hussein sometimes seem to be disaffected. Iran has signed agreements with Russia for economic and technical aid; Hussein recently opened diplomatic relations with Russia, hopes to get Soviet aid. Sometimes, in trying to please one friend, the U.S. offends others. Thus, President Johnson flew to Manhattan last month for a fund-raising dinner for Israel's Weizmann Institute, announced that the U.S. would help Israel desalt sea water with nuclear energy. This infuriated the entire Arab world.

Pakistan, for years one of the U.S.'s firmest Asian friends, is turning toward a sullen neutralism, recently laid out the red carpet for China's Chou Enlai, constantly protests U.S. aid to India. Most of Africa's new nations, glorying in their independence but still struggling to meet the responsibility that independence brings (see cover story, THE WORLD), seem committed to staying uncommitted between West and East.

Even Libya, which has a key U.S. air base, is moving to shake off its U.S. entanglements. In Latin America, U.S.Panama diplomatic relations remain ruptured; Brazil, with its eccentric government, plans to legalize the nation's Communist Party, is talking about recognizing Red China; Argentina has just signed a contract to sell a million tons of wheat to Communist China, while Mexico trades with China, maintains relations with Castro.

An Opportunity. All this is most distressing to the U.S., and it is only small comfort that the Soviet Union is in an even worse fix with its own allies. Yet in the very decline of "alliance diplomacy" may lie a real opportunity for the U.S. to re-examine its own policies and to advance its own cause.

What most frets the U.S. is that its allies are unilaterally pursuing their ends. This often comes at a cost to commit ments under the multilateral, generally geographical systems of treaty alliances that the U.S. worked so hard for so long to build up as the free world's best bulwark against Communism.

Of these systems, only NATO still seems to be working. Few would argue that SEATO, for example, has much force and effect. The Organization of American States so far has failed to achieve order within the American states; as for the Alliance for Progress, it has been a high-minded failure.

The U.S. has its own interests--many of which might be satisfied better through unilateral action than through "alliance diplomacy." In this sense, former Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy, one of the ablest diplomats ever to serve the U.S. (see BOOKS), had some succinct words to say last week while receiving an award from his alma mater, Marquette University, at a Manhattan dinner. Murphy was not, he said, suggesting that the U.S. "abandon the collective approach, or withdraw from the U.N. or our alliances. What I do say is that in appropriate cases our Government should demonstrate its power and capacity to deal directly with a provocation--whether in Panama, Ghana or Cuba. If we do this from time to time in suitable situations, I am convinced that the United States will regain an element which it seems more recently to have lost--that is, international respect both for American leadership and American power."

Two Principles. It has become fairly fashionable in world diplomatic circles to deride "principle" in favor of "pragmatism." Yet the pragmatic approach can be truly successful only if based on principle. And any new formulation of U.S. foreign policy must rest on at least two closely interrelated principles--one political and the other economic.

Politically, the U.S. must continue--although the principle may seem old-fashioned--to try to make the world safe for democracy. This does not mean imposing its own brand of government on everyone; it does mean moving vigorously to strengthen free governments and open societies wherever possible. The political aim of U.S. policy should be toward what Dean Rusk has called "a decent world order." Economically, the U.S. cause demands more aggressive promotion of open world markets, of greater freedom for private enterprise in international trade, of safeguards for investors abroad. For only by fostering private enterprise can the U.S. truly capitalize on its most basic advantage over Communism.

While the diplomacy of friendship and alliance has often served the U.S. and the free world well in the postwar years, the condition of a changing world now suggests that the way is open to the U.S. to serve its cause even better. Dwight Eisenhower used an old phrase to express the philosophy--and it clearly seems to fit the needs of a new era. It is "enlightened self-interest."

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