"Let's Not Kid Ourselves"

Where were they? Headed for Wilmington? Leaving Cleveland? Circling Miami? Such was the pace of Republican William Scranton's headlong campaign for the G.O.P. presidential nomination that in the minds of aides and newsmen traveling with him in his chartered Electra, places and events blurred.

Scranton often prowled the plane, ignoring the FASTEN SEAT BELTS sign, to chat with reporters. Once, he picked up the galley telephone, read over the aircraft loudspeaker system a lengthy statement that got far less attention than it deserved.

The Evidence. "Since in politics almost anything can happen from day to day, it would not necessarily be impossible for Senator Goldwater to beat Lyndon Johnson in November," said Scranton above the Electra's drone.

"But there is such a thing as playing with odds so long that only the most optimistic partisan would have anything but a glimmer of hope. I believe that would be the position of the Republican Party with Barry as the candidate.

"Many persons have believed this, of course, for a long time. Why, then, am I saying it this bluntly now for the first time? First of all, I am a party man, and I don't believe I should lightly question the ability of a fellow Republican to win. After most serious thought, I have determined in my own mind that the more serious disservice to party unity and to party vitality would be to keep quiet about it. If for reasons other than a determination to win in November my party is to be steamrollered into nominating Barry--something I don't believe is going to happen--then at the very least we ought not to kid ourselves about what we are doing."

Insisting that "the evidence against a Goldwater candidacy is so devastating as to be incapable of complete error," Scranton continued: "In state after state, surveys show that against Lyndon Johnson, Barry would not carry even a majority of Republican voters." He reeled off the results of polls taken among Republicans, some by independent pollsters, some by his own public opinion specialist, Philadelphia's John Bucci: nationally, 62% of Republicans would vote for Johnson, only 29% for Goldwater; in New Jersey, 72% of Republicans prefer Johnson, 20% Goldwater; Maryland, 63% Johnson, 27% Goldwater; Ohio, 64% Johnson, 17% Goldwater; Iowa, 52% Johnson, 30% Goldwater; Minnesota, 46% Johnson, 44% Goldwater.

Concluded Scranton: "Barry's chances in the cities are just unbelievably poor. Yesterday, for instance, we completed our latest check in Philadelphia. Barry Goldwater can count on only 11% of the total vote against Lyndon Johnson.

"If Senator Goldwater is nominated, I will support him and work for him, whatever the long odds of his being elected.

"On the other hand, I think that if I am the candidate, I can beat Lyndon Johnson."

The Coalition. In that statement lay the sum and substance of Scranton's campaign strategy. If he is to perform the near miracle of heading off Goldwater, he must convince the G.O.P. and the nation that 1) Barry would run so badly against President Johnson as to drag down and perhaps defeat Republican candidates at all levels, and 2) he, Bill Scranton, would have a far better chance against Johnson, might even win, and in any event would enhance the chances of other G.O.P. candidates.

Behind Scranton's candidacy were coalescing most of the major forces of moderate Republicanism--with the notable exceptions of Dwight Eisenhower, who still refuses to take a public stand, and Richard Nixon, who remains tangled in the web of his own ambitions. Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. was coming back from Saigon "to do everything I can" to aid Scranton. Nelson Rockefeller had turned over to Scranton the facilities of his own presidential campaign organization, and last week went so far as to say he would not support Goldwater even if Barry was the Republican nominee. Michigan's Governor George Romney, although not yet formally announced for Scranton, was determined to fight any attempt by Goldwater delegates to write a Goldwater-oriented platform in San Francisco.

There were, of course, disappointments. While Scranton's cause was helped by the reaffirmation of Ohio's 58-member delegation to vote for a favorite son, Governor James Rhodes, on the first ballot, Scranton's hopes for a breakthrough in the Illinois and Indiana delegations were rebuffed. Early in the week, Scranton stopped by the Capitol Hill office of Illinois' Senator Everett Dirksen, pointedly suggested that Ev would make a "great favorite son." But Dirksen was having no part of such a holding action. He was convinced that Goldwater had a strangle hold on the Illinois delegation, and, he said later, Scranton's suggestion "just sort of flopped onto my desk and stayed there." That same day, Scranton asked Indiana's Representative Charles Hal-leek for help with the Indiana delegation. Replied Halleck: "Come back and see me before the second ballot--if there is one."

What He Was Saying. In their coverage of Scranton's campaign, most reporters seemed to be concentrating on the success or failure of such efforts at delegate scrounging. As a result, much of what Scranton was saying in his public speeches received only cursory notice. Yet what he was saying was well worth hearing.

At Newark's Essex House, Scranton obviously referred to Goldwater's weakness in the East when he declared: "Republicans in New Jersey and Republicans in Pennsylvania both want to participate in the election of a Republican as the next President of the U.S. Neither of us is prepared to have the East Coast of this great nation sawed off and set afloat in the ocean this November. We want to win."

In Cleveland, Scranton compared Goldwater's conservatism unfavorably to that of Ohio's own late Senator Bob Taft. "Bob Taft was a conservative in the truest sense of the word," Scranton declared. "He sought to conserve all of the human values that have been carried down to us on the long stream of American history. He saw history as the foundation on which a better future might be built--not as a Technicolor fantasy behind which the problems of the present might be concealed. Bob Taft didn't say stop social security--he said extend it to all elder citizens who are not now eligible. He didn't say quit the United Nations--he said make the United Nations work. He didn't say forget our cities--he said provide the housing which will make our cities livable. In fact, he was the father of our modern housing legislation."

In Detroit, Scranton dealt with the complex problem of automation, called it "the first gigantic step toward a fundamental change in the basis for human society." He quoted Aristotle's assertion that "when looms weave by themselves, man's slavery will end," and added: "That day has almost arrived. We right now possess the technological means to conquer poverty and economic slavery for the first time in history. The only question that remains is whether this physical bondage will be replaced by a new slavery of the soul and mind. The underlying philosophy of the Administration boils down basically to this: delay automation as long as possible by harassing industry; when automation does come, tax the increased profits out of the economy and use these to pay relief or some similar kind of dole to the workers who have lost their jobs. I say this answer is wrong for the economy, but it is most of all wrong for the workers themselves. The workers of America are not looking for an easy berth, a soft touch, a free ride. The workers of America are seeking an honest return for honest labor."

And in Miami Beach, Scranton delivered perhaps the most forceful, sense-making Republican statement so far about U.S. policy toward Castro's Cuba. Said he: "Our national policy has become one of reacting to events rather than one of seizing opportunities. In few places can we see present American indecision so clearly as we can see it in Cuba. The Castro regime is becoming more deeply entrenched in Cuba with each passing day. It has openly pledged its allegiance to the Communist camp. It has built a powerful military machine, second only to our own in this hemisphere.

"The leadership vacuum has produced an unacceptable and dangerous reaction. Some well-intentioned Americans, frustrated by the paralysis in our foreign policy, have turned to a doctrine of naked power. This doctrine holds that 'total victory' can be won by simply standing up to the Russians, both guns drawn. It reduces the complexities of foreign policy to simple emotional terms that have wide appeal in the American experience--the rugged individualism of the pioneer, the gun-slinging marshal of the frontier town, the expedition of marines to clean out the pirates in Barbary or the corrupt governments of the Caribbean.

"But do these emotions and personal demonstrations of conviction provide the basis for an effective foreign policy? No. No President of the United States can avoid the problem of power and how to use it effectively and responsibly. An effective policy does not consist in orders to the marines to turn on the water mains at Guantanamo, or in unleashing Cuban exiles to attack Russian merchant ships trading with Cuba.

"While our objective is to expel the Communist leadership, we cannot return Cuba to the social and economic base of 1959. We must turn the social revolution already in progress toward democratic directions and control. To succeed, we must separate the Cuban, people from their Communist rulers. We can do this only through a coordinated three-pronged strategy of economic, psychological and guerrilla warfare.

"First, we must continue and extend the free world economic boycott of Cuba. We have failed in communicating the seriousness of our purpose to our European allies and in enlisting their cooperation. We need to establish far better cooperative measures of passport and personnel surveillance at the ports and borders of other Latin American countries to control the stream of subversive activity which now flows like poison out of Cuba.

"Second, we must mount an effective psychological campaign against the Castro government. We need more basic intelligence on the attitudes of the workers, the middle classes, and other sections of the Cuban population toward the revolution and the regime.

"The third element of an effective strategy is the coordinated use of Cuban exile forces. If we mean business, we have a responsibility to give free Cubans full financial, moral, and political support--including the organization and equipping of Cuban exile forces. A free Cuba will need a well-organized, disciplined, democratically oriented force capable of assuming full governmental authority upon the overthrow of Castro."

Taking It Easy. What was Barry Goldwater doing while Scranton was campaigning? He was lying low. His advisers feel certain that his present delegate lead is so great that his nomination is assured if he can only stay out of political trouble. In other words, silence is Goldwater. Thus he occupied himself most of last week logging hours in an Air Force jet (he is a major general in the Air Force Reserve) and preparing like any other proud father for the 800-guest weekend wedding of his daughter Peggy, 19.

But even as the Goldwater strategists coasted on the assumption that Barry had the nomination sewed up, there were indications that other pragmatic politicians viewed a Goldwater candidacy as doomed to defeat in November. One Gallup poll showed that 73% of Republican and Democratic county chairmen believed that Johnson would beat Goldwater, while only 27% foresaw a Goldwater victory. Asked to rate the strongest possible Republican candidate, the Democratic chair men voted: Scranton, 302; Goldwater, 297; Nixon, 246; Rockefeller, 246; Lodge, 243.

Earlier polls had shown that one of Scranton's greatest handicaps was that he was not broadly known across the U.S. But this week Gallup released the results of a new poll that demonstrated how dramatically the Scranton campaign has changed that picture. Gallup reported that rank-and-file Republicans now prefer Scranton over Goldwater, 55% to 34%. Just as significantly, among independent voters--and the G.O.P. will need plenty of them to defeat Johnson--Scranton is preferred by 62% to Goldwater's 24% .

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.