Confessions from Suspects

One January evening in 1960 a 22-year-old laborer named Danny Escobedo was taken into custody by Chicago police. Under intensive questioning he confessed to complicity in the slaying of his brother-in-law. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison for first-degree murder. Escobedo appealed on the grounds that the police had refused his requests to allow him to consult his lawyer during the interrogation and that his confession had not been voluntary. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed that the confession was involuntary and reversed his conviction; then the state asked for a rehearing, persuaded the court to reverse itself and uphold the sentence.

New Rules. Last week, in a ruling that will cause profound changes in American criminal procedures, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed Danny's conviction. In last year's landmark Gideon v. Wainwright decision, the court held that every defendant in a state or federal criminal trial is entitled to counsel. In Danny's case, the court extended the Gideon principle and ruled that a person is entitled to consult with counsel as soon as an investigation makes him a prime suspect.

Taking note of warnings that giving suspects such a right to counsel would greatly diminish the number of confessions obtained by police between arrest and formal indictment, Justice Goldberg, who wrote the five-man majority opinion, said, "This argument cuts two ways. The fact that many confessions are obtained during this period points up its critical nature at a stage when legal aid and advice are surely needed." Law enforcement "which comes to depend on the confession," declared Justice Goldberg, "will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation. If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that system."

Strong Dissents. The four dissenting justices felt very strongly that there was something wrong with the majority's reasoning. The new ruling is unworkable, said Justice Byron White, "unless police cars are equipped with public defenders." Said Justice John Marshall Harlan: "I think the rule is most ill-conceived and that it seriously and unjustifiedly fetters perfectly legitimate methods of criminal law enforcement."

Across the country, the dissenters' worries were echoed by police and prosecutors alike. "Naturally we would like to talk to a person before his lawyer does," said Houston Police Chief Hobson McGill, "because we know that many a lawyer is unscrupulous and will advise his client to say nothing, even when he knows that his client is guilty." The ruling, sighed Los Angeles County Counsel John Collins, "gives the criminal one more advantage." Perhaps so, answered Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Macklin Fleming, but he added that it was a problem competent and hard-working police should be able to take in stride.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.