A PLAN TO SHARE THE WEAPONS

REPUBLICAN GOLDWATER'S suggestion that the U.S. "share" know-how about and control over its nu clear weaponry with NATO allies is one that has been seriously considered by U.S. leaders during the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. Last week former NATO Commander Lauris Norstad, now president of Owens-Corning Fiberglas International, appeared before 2,500 people at the Mayo Centennial Symposium in Rochester, Minn., and came up with some "sharing" proposals that would, in his educated opinion, enable the U.S. to "get on with the business of developing a solution that would have some chance of being accepted on both sides of the Atlantic."

Questions. Said Norstad: "For too long we Americans have worked on the assumption that the nations of Europe would be satisfied, or would have to be satisfied, to leave the nuclear elements of the common defense to U.S. invention, control and direction. For a number of years, Europeans have been addressing two questions to Americans with increasing bluntness and urgency.

"First, since the Europeans depend upon the common defense, and since the NATO military forces in Europe themselves depend to a considerable extent on nuclear weapons, should there not be an absolute guarantee that some minimum stock of these weapons will be available in an emergency, even if the U.S. might be inclined to limit its own participation? Second, should not the Europeans be in a position to exercise some real measure of influence and control over weapons that are no less essential to their security than to our own?"

To Norstad, long a strong supporter of a NATO nuclear-strike force, the answer to both questions is yes. Under his plan, NATO's three nuclear producers--the U.S., Britain and France--would create a stock pile of weapons. "Whatever these countries agree to put in," he said, "should, in an emergency, be available in the common interest, unimpaired by the possibility of a last-minute veto by one or another of the nuclear powers." At the heart of Norstad's plan is the creation of an executive committee whose nucleus would be the Big Three. In this respect, the plan is reminiscent of Charles de Gaulle's longstanding--and long-rebuffed--demand for a U.S.-British-French triumvirate to direct NATO. But Norstad adds that the committee he envisions would be "open to all powers whenever their interests may be directly or critically involved."

Majority Rule. How would the committee decide whether to squeeze the nuclear trigger--the key question of all? Said Norstad: "In the interest of prompt decision, the committee, and through it the alliance, should be ruled by the decision of the majority. The majority decision would not bind, at least initially, a nation positively dissenting."

Norstad was the first to admit his plan is "imperfect" as it stands. But he insisted on its merit as a measure toward "putting at least one of the rooms of our house in some order. It would bring the NATO nuclear capability under the collective authority of the alliance, while still respecting the sovereign rights and responsibilities of the separate nuclear powers." As such, he said, "it is worth considering."

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