The Right Not to Work

The strike was as ill-timed and startling as a sneeze on a high wire--but, incredibly, there it was. Just when it seemed that the nation would be able to avoid trouble in the vital auto industry this year, and thus avoid possible upset to the advancing economy, Walter Reuther and the United Auto Workers hit the bricks against giant General Motors, whose daily operations affect the jobs and lives of countless Americans. And for what?

G.M. had already agreed to the same terms that had been the basis of the union's settlement with Chrysler and Ford, and not a single economic issue remained in dispute. Walter Reuther took out 263,284 workers and closed down 89 G.M. plants across the U.S. because of a handful of work rules--and his own need to play internal union politics.

The union at General Motors has been spoiling for a fight for months. In March, a group of local union presidents from G.M. plants staged a brief uprising against Reuther at the United Auto Workers' convention in Atlantic City, demanded and won a tough approach toward G.M. in this year's bargaining. When auto negotiations began in earnest, Reuther reserved his sharpest barbs for G.M., calling it a "huge, dehumanized production machine." When Reuther picked Chrysler as his first strike target, union members from G.M. accused him of selling them out because of his fear of "the big one." Reuther succumbed to the strike mood of G.M.'s workers, many of whom walked off their jobs hours before the Friday morning strike deadline was actually reached.

Rival for Dickens. Why are the workers so mad at G.M.? Speaking in terms that might have seemed suitable to Charles Dickens or Lincoln Steffens, Reuther charged that G.M. was "unwilling to provide workers with the minimum conditions of human decency." The company, he added, also schedules excessive overtime and disciplines workers without informing them of charges against them. The workers may have some justified grievances. G.M. is tougher than the other auto companies in imposing discipline and controlling working conditions, allows no infringements on managerial efficiency. But Reuther was plainly exaggerating. In fact, he was less interested in improved working conditions for the man on the line than in the issue that really bothers the U.A.W.: G.M.'s treatment of union representatives in its plants. G.M. makes them work.

In both Ford and Chrysler plants, the union's committeemen are paid full wages by the company, yet never do a lick of factory work, spend all their time handling union business. G.M. requires the 1,796 committeemen in its plants--at least one for every 250 workers--to work part time at their regular jobs, leaving most of them only 15 hours a week free for union business. G.M.'s committeemen, powerful in the union, have long resented being treated differently from their counterparts at Ford and Chrysler and have stirred up workers' resentment against G.M. Even when G.M. made a last-minute offer to increase the time left free for union business, Reuther held out.

Shrewd Move. In calling the strike, Reuther shrewdly did not pull out all of G.M.'s 345,000 U.A.W. workers, ordered plants that produce parts used by the other three automakers to continue working. By assuring the continued production of 1965 Ford, Chrysler and American Motors cars, he thus put added pressure on G.M. to settle. G.M. has already produced more than 300,000 of its 1965 models, which it figures will last dealers about two weeks if auto sales continue at their present pace; beyond that, G.M. will be in trouble. By not idling all of the G.M. plants, Reuther also avoided possible strike-benefit payments to some 82,000 G.M. workers, thereby ensuring that the union treasury could finance a strike for about twelve weeks.

No one expects the strike to come to anything like that. But once the workers have walked out, it takes a while to get them back even after a settlement, and there are 17,900 local work issues that local unions may insist on having taken care of before they go back to work.

A lengthy strike against G.M. would certainly have a crippling effect on the nation's economy, and Reuther presumably does not want to do that. This week, as management and labor resumed negotiations, a federal mediator was standing by to help forestall an economic crisis, especially in the month before the election.

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