Anatomy of Triumph

When the land suddenly slides, most of the old familiar patterns are ob- literated--and Johnson's triumph was achieved by smashing across regional, economic and ideological lines that had long held firm for the G.O.P. At the same time, he drew massive support from all of the traditional Democratic voting blocs and metropolitan machines to rack up huge pluralities in the big cities.

Only a massive defection of Republicans to Johnson--based generally on the fear that Goldwater was simply too unpredictable to be trusted with one of the highest positions of leadership in the free world--could account for John- son's sweep of New England and the Midwest.

Town & Country. The small Protestant towns of New England had long been strongholds of Yankee conservatism; yet Johnson knocked them off consistently. Verona, Me., (pop. 435) went for Johnson 139 to 55--almost an exact reversal of its 1960 margin for Richard Nixon. Of Connecticut's 169 towns, Johnson won all but eleven --a feat unmatched even by Roosevelt. While conservative on economic and domestic matters, New Englanders tend to be international-minded--and Goldwater's trigger-happy image hurt him there. So did his confused stance on social security, particularly since it was so publicly aired by Fellow Republican Nelson Rockefeller in the New Hampshire primary.

The widespread fear that Goldwater might slash farm price supports and down- grade the Rural Electrification Administration helped lead to his sorry showing in the rural Midwest. Johnson almost wiped out the big G.O.P. margins traditional in downstate Illinois. He carried some rural areas of Wisconsin by an unprecedented 60%. He took North Dakota's Ward County-- which had gone to Nixon in 1960--by a margin of 2 to 1. At the same time, Johnson also knocked down the normal Republican margins in Midwest suburban areas, even carried Missouri's suburban St. Louis County. In the Rocky Mountain states and the Far West, the Goldwater campaign reached its high point at the time of his nomination--and it went downhill thereafter. Somehow, Lyndon came off as more of a Westerner's Westerner than Barry, and Goldwater emerged as the man who might upset defense-oriented industry and much appreciated programs of federal aid.

City Sweep. Johnson's greatest triumphs, however, came in the nation's large cities. He cracked even such Republican metropolitan areas as Indian- apolis and Columbus, where the G.O.P. suffered from lack of organization and apathy toward Goldwater. Yet despite the prediction of a huge Johnson victory, Democratic ward leaders proved far from complacent, turned out their labor and minority blocs in spectacular fashion to produce comfortable voting cushions. Johnson rolled up a record 400,000-vote margin in Philadel- phia, some 70,000 better than Jack Kennedy had done. He won New York City by a whopping 1,300,000, Baltimore by 155,000 (more than half of his hefty Maryland margin). He led by some 650,000 in Chicago, 350,000 in Detroit, 100,000 in Milwaukee, 300,000 in Los Angeles.

A significant part of those margins was supplied by Negroes, who had cast about 70% of their vote for Kennedy, but this year voted nearly unanimously for Johnson because of Goldwater's vote against the 1964 Civil Rights Act and his advocacy of states' rights. This was no small factor, since an estimated 6,000,000 Negroes were registered-- an increase of about 1,000,000 since 1960. Some 95% of the registered Ne- gro voters in California trooped to the polls, turned in nearly 100% vote for Johnson. In four Negro precincts of Nash ville, Tenn., the vote was 5,468 to 62 in L.B.J.'s favor. In Philadelphia's Negro wards, Johnson rolled up 160,917 votes to 14,093 for Goldwater. In a Negro precinct of Richmond, the vote was up 200% from 1960, and it went for Johnson, 1,257 to 4. Negroes gave Johnson much of his margin in Florida, went 98% for him in a Jacksonville precinct.

No Backlash. While Negroes voted in greater numbers than ever before, the much discussed Northern white backlash--the defection of Democrats to Goldwater out of resentment of the Negro civil rights drive--did not show up. Philadelphia had been racked by Negro riots; yet L.B.J.'s margin was huge. Suburban Baltimore was considered rife for a backlash vote; yet Johnson carried it. Western Kentucky whites

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