Friday, Nov. 06, 1964
In Gear Again
It takes considerable patience, but among those who follow the oracular pronouncements of Charles de Gaulle it is axiomatic that in the long run he is usually right. Two years ago, when he braked Europe's march toward political integration by excluding Britain from the Common Market, he acted in the belief that les Anglos are fundamentally more interested in strengthening the Atlantic Alliance than in making common cause with Europe. Besides, reasoned De Gaulle, Britain's pro-European Tory government would soon be replaced by Laborites who are basically antagonistic to the booming, unabashedly capitalistic Common Market, and suspicious of Europeans as well. Last week in London a Labor government was busily proving De Gaulle right on both counts (see below).
Against the Grain. However, De Gaulle's prognostications are often more successful than his policies. Two years ago, in hope of establishing Franco-German dominance in European affairs, De Gaulle signed his treaty of cooperation with Bonn. In practice, the entente has been mostly verbal: the Germans have refused to cooperate in joint weapons production, want no part of De Gaulle's incipient nuclear force, and have further provoked le grand Charles by enthusiastically endorsing U.S. plans for the mixed-manned NATO surface fleet, MLF, which Paris ridicules as the force de farce.
At home, De Gaulle is in trouble with his farmers as a result of Bonn's refusal to lower grain prices according to the Common Market schedule. Thus France, which would dearly like to sell the Germans its grain surplus, finally announced last month that if the problem was not settled soon, it would "cease to participate" in the Common Market--a typically Delphic threat that could mean anything from the "empty chair" technique to outright repudiation of the Rome Treaty. Last week, with a grand Gaullist flourish, the French initialed a $700 million trade agreement with Moscow, further irritating its Common Market partners by giving Russia easy credit terms that most other NATO nations consider strategically unwise.
Spaakistan. From the headlines, the dream of a united Continent seemed more illusory than ever. In fact, it looked last week as if Europe's long-stalled political machinery was in gear again. For one thing, the Labor victory in England has persuaded pro-British Europeans that there is no longer much point in holding out for British membership in the Common Market before discussing political integration.
As for Bonn, De Gaulle's unassailably correct stand on grain prices may give Ludwig Erhard just the leverage he needs to reform his nation's inefficient agriculture. For while Germany economically is less dependent than France on the Common Market, politically and psychologically it is even more deeply committed to European unity.
While De Gaulle has insisted all along that the only feasible political union must be a loose confederation of sovereign states, convinced Europeans such as Belgium's Paul-Henri Spaak have clung to the ideal of a single, truly supranational U.S. of Europe. ("Spaakistan!" snorts De Gaulle.) Recently, however, Spaak has come round to the Gaullist approach, at least as a practical first step toward ultimate integration. Moreover, at week's end there were signs that Charles de Gaulle might also be in a mood for compromise. After an hour's chat with his old antagonist at the Elysee Palace, the ebullient Belgian Foreign Minister pointedly refrained from his usual barbed quips at De Gaulle's expense. The most significant omen to date was De Gaulle's decision last week to call in an even more influential critic of Gaullism, Jean Monnet, founding father of the Common Market. Clearly, something big was stirring, something as big as Europe.
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