To NATO's Brink

On the surface it looked like a case of megalomania aggravated by logic.

The megalomania seemed to be De Gaulle's, determined as he was to be the leader of Europe and apparently ready to wreck both the Common Market and NATO if they stood in his way.

The logic was provided by his Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, who was full of brilliant French arguments about how a true partnership between the U.S. and France required two entirely separate policies. On closer examination, however, the megalomania was perhaps not quite so maniacal and the logic not quite so logical.

No Mood for Patience. On the Common Market, the French position was, on the whole, unassailable. All Paris really wanted was for West Germany to stick to a previously reached agreement for the reduction of agricultural prices. Because Germany's inefficient subsidized farmers want no part of this and because Chancellor Ludwig Erhard faces an election next year, Bonn was dragging its feet. A more sympathetic character than Charles de Gaulle might have understood and been patient. De Gaulle understood, all right, but he was in no mood for patience. There were renewed threats that unless he got satisfaction on the issue, he might pull out of the Market entirely.

Would he really do it? "France will look twice before making a fatal move," declared Le Monde, pointing out that thanks to the Treaty of Rome, French industrialists have broken with a long tradition of protectionism and have been building industrial strength on a multinational scale-the only way to meet American competition. Yet Premier Georges Pompidou was quoted by friends as saying, "Nous partirons." He could of course be talking of a limited departure-perhaps absence from sessions of The Six for a few weeks.

French Reasoning. On NATO, the French position is considerably less logical. Basically, De Gaulle holds that to be truly sovereign today, a nation needs its own atomic deterrent, and he insists that France must have its force de frappe rather than rely on the U.S.

But what about other European countries, notably West Germany? To them he says blandly that they can always rely on France. In short, he treats the rest of Europe the way he says Washington treats him.

For that reason he opposes MLF, the U.S.-backed scheme for internationally manned, nuclear-equipped surface ships that would give European nations a sense of participation in nuclear defense but still leave with the U.S. President the actual decision to use the missiles. At an eleven-hour foreign-policy debate in the French assembly, Couve de Murville in effect argued that MLF is a phony, that it would divide and not unite Europe. He was particularly angry at Bonn, which had accepted MLF as well as virtually every other U.S. plan, while being increasingly cool to De Gaulle's policies.

Where French reasoning breaks down is that MLF would give the Germans at least a squeeze on the nuclear trigger, while the French force de frappe would give them, in effect, nothing. The point was perfectly expressed in a recent conversation between a German and a French official. The dialogue went something like this: Frenchman: We need you in our force de frappe. An atomic arsenal is expensive, and German cooperation would be to both our advantages.

German: But your offer is much more costly than MLF. Who would have ultimate say in the use of the weapons under your plan? Frenchman: Well, of course, we would expect to maintain control.

German: You are saying that we should invest much more money in a tiny atomic force that you control rather than less money in an enormous atomic force that the Americans control. We would get more of our money's worth with the Americans.

Frenchman: Ah, mon ami, you do not understand the Americans. You only fought against them in two wars.

They were our allies. And let me tell you, they always come late.

Stirring Gestures. The only alternative to 1) MLF and 2) a French-controlled nuclear force would be a truly integrated European army with its own nuclear capacity. But De Gaulle dislikes the idea of such integration, and Washington dislikes the idea of giving up its nuclear veto. If the U.S. persists with the MLF scheme-which Britain's Labor government may accept, although with modifications-the French hint that they might pull out of NATO.

Just how France would go about this is of course interesting. All the way? Limited withdrawals? Probably the latter, with such starting gestures as pulling French officers out of supreme headquarters near Paris or out of the NATO standing group in Washington.

If that didn't have sufficient effect, then might come the withdrawal of the two ground divisions or the 27 fighter-bomber squadrons that operate as part of NATO's central command.

Whether this is what De Gaulle actually has in mind, no one can tell.

Chances are, however, that he is merely trying to push things to the brink of chaos and then have the pieces reassembled more to his liking. Said Pompidou: "The Atlantic Alliance must be rethought. It must be remolded, reorganized." Probably true, but how? Neither Pompidou nor Couve nor anyone else in France so far has made any practical suggestions.

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