Toward a Winning Commitment

The U.S. is committed to preventing a Communist military victory in South Viet Nam. That is settled fact.

But how many American troops will it take to fulfill that commitment? And to what degree should they be involved in the actual fighting? The answers to these questions are far from settled.

Last week they were the subject of continuing controversy--and confusion.

Doubt & Confirmation. The Viet Cong's monsoon-season offensive was under way (see THE WORLD), and the Johnson Administration last week announced publicly for the first time that U.S. troops have been authorized to fight, in combat units, alongside their South Vietnamese allies. The announcement was fair warning to the nation to expect a greater U.S. commitment and heavier U.S. casualties in the future.

Robert McCloskey, a State Department public information officer, told reporters that U.S. forces were prepared to give "combat support" to Vietnamese troops at the discretion of General William C. Westmoreland, the U.S. commander in South Viet Nam. McCloskey's statement triggered an outcry that this represented a new and reckless U.S. policy.

Stung by the criticism, the President ordered a White House press release intended to cast doubt on the State Department statement. As it turned out, the presidential denial was a confirmation. It said that there has been "no change" in the "primary mission" of U.S. ground troops--that of guarding such installations as the Air Force at Danang. Of course, it continued, General Westmoreland is empowered to send U.S. combat units into battle, "if help is requested" by Vietnamese commanders.

Westmoreland has had that authority since last March, when U.S. Marines landed in Viet Nam. From the time of their arrival, the Marines have been moving through a five-stage plan geared to get them into full combat, side by side with the Vietnamese. In the first stage, they constructed a defense perimeter at Danang airbase; second, they sent out small patrols a mile or so beyond the defense line; third, they moved bigger patrols as far as five miles out, seeking to find and fight the Viet Cong; fourth, they moved out eight miles or more, accompanied by small Vietnamese combat units; and fifth, they plan to head out in full combat-platoon patrols with full-size Vietnamese platoons.

"The Limit." The State Department's declaration, followed by the White House denial that actually confirmed it, naturally caused plenty of talk in Washington. Amid rumors that he would soon resign because of various ailments (deafness, a bad back), U.S. Ambassador to South Viet Nam Maxwell Taylor was in town to consult with the President. When reporters asked Taylor about reports that Johnson wants U.S. forces beefed up--possibly to 100,000 men by the end of the year--Taylor would only say cautiously, "I know of no such project."

Another visitor to the White House was Australia's Prime Minister Robert Gordon Menzies, who delighted Lyndon Johnson by staunchly backing the U.S. stand. "Viet Nam is the frontier of freedom," said Menzies, who recently ordered 900 Australian troops to Viet Nam. "Abandonment would mean that country would be overrun by the North, and we can't have that."

Despite the stakes and the growing American commitment, South Viet Nam is still a long way from being a Korea. U.S. forces ashore in Viet Nam total just 53,500. Only 13,000 U.S. troops are actually part of organized combat components--including 9,500 Marines and 3,500 men of the Army's 173rd Airborne Brigade. At the peak of the fighting in Korea, U.S. combat forces totaled a quarter of a million men.

Problem of Etiquette. A more pertinent case than Korea is the battle put up by the British in Malaya. There, led by General Sir Gerald Templer, they tenaciously fought Communist guerrillas side by side with Malayan nationals, throwing thousands and thousands of British soldiers into the war until it was finally and totally won in 1960. Because Malaya was a British colony, there was no problem of diplomatic etiquette, of waiting for an invitation before plunging into combat, such as the U.S. has had to face in Viet Nam.

The idea of a Korean, or a Malayan, degree of involvement in South Viet Nam is unpalatable to most Americans. But it is not unthinkable, if only because it may be necessary to meet the basic U.S. commitment. One of the Johnson Administration's major problems has been the average American's notion that the war in South Viet Nam is little more than a skirmish between opposing Asians. President Johnson is in the process of dispelling that notion by sending more and more American men to do more and more fighting there. Such deepening involvement calls for results beyond stalemate. Thus, the President's problem in the months to come will not be to defend the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia but to devise a strategy that will lead to the U.S.'s gaining the upper hand.

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