The War Council

Hour after hour for three days last week, President Johnson sat with top military, diplomatic, political and intelligence advisers in an extraordinary council of war.

Occasion for the sessions was the return from a five-day inspection trip to South Viet Nam of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Ambassador-designate Henry Cabot Lodge, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle Wheeler.

During that trip, McNamara received from both South Viet Nam's Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and the U.S. field commander, General William Westmoreland requests that the number of American troops in Viet Nam, now at about 75,000, be considerably increased. By jet, Jeep and helicopter, McNamara traveled the fighting fronts, talking with U.S. troops and getting on-the-scene briefings. He flew to the aircraft carrier Independence, patrolling 80 miles off the Vietnamese coast, watched jet bombers take off to attack North Viet Nam.

He visited the village of Le My, eight miles from the big U.S.-operated airbase at Danang, was told that Le My had been taken from the Viet Cong and turned into a model village. Some 400 Vietnamese who had been living under Viet Cong control have voluntarily moved to Le My.

Bad But Not Black. About to return to the U.S., McNamara told newsmen at Saigon airport that "in many aspects, there has been deterioration since I was here last, 15 months ago. The size of the Viet Cong forces has increased; their rate of operations and the intensity of their attacks have been expanded; their disruption of the lines of communication, both rail and sea and road, is much more extensive; and they have intensified their campaign of terror against the civilian population." He might have added that there is general recognition that even in the last few months the U.S. has made errors in Viet Nam that have resulted in the Viet Cong's gaining territory from which it may be difficult to dislodge them for a long while (see THE WORLD).

But, continued McNamara, the "picture is not all black." Behind that statement lay the fact that U.S. air strikes both in South Viet Nam and against North Viet Nam are definitely and visibly having effect. In the ground war, the Viet Cong are taking heavier casualties than the South Vietnamese government troops. Moreover, the Communists presumably know that they cannot achieve real victory until they occupy South Viet Nam's important population centers, and to do that, they must operate as large units. Yet any such move from terrorism and guerrilla warfare would render them vulnerable to superior American and South Vietnamese firepower.

Back in Washington only two hours, McNamara got an 8 a.m. phone call from President Johnson, who wanted his impressions about "some of the more obvious questions about Viet Nam." The President told him to organize his notes and send them to the White House for a quick reading before the first of the war-council sessions, scheduled for later that morning.

Among the major matters reviewed and discussed during the White House meetings that followed for the rest of the week:

> THE SIZE OF THE U.S. TROOP COMMITMENT IN VIET NAM. That it would be increased was taken for granted. Indeed, even before McNamara, Lodge and Wheeler left for Viet Nam, Johnson had told associates that troop increases "of substantial proportions" would be required. Still open to question was just how many men might be needed and, outside the Cabinet Room, guesses AP ranged from 150,000 to 250,000 by the end of this year.

> THE POSSIBLE CALL-UP OF U.S. RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD UNITS. President Johnson could hardly have forgotten the outcry that came after John Kennedy activated two National Guard divisions during the 1961 Berlin crisis; as it turned out, the divisions were not militarily ready, and had probably not been needed in the first place. Johnson, who certainly does not care to make any such mistakes, has been understandably cautious. But he was being urged to call up at least two "top priority" Guard divisions to fill the service pipeline. Also discussed: extension of present enlistments and an expanded draft call. If the President made any firm decisions, he kept them to himself last week.

> THE COST OF THE INCREASED EFFORT. Almost certainly in the works was a request of at least $2 billion in extra appropriations for fiscal 1966 to meet the cost of the Viet Nam war on which the U.S. already is spending $1.3 billion a year.

Also a Worry. The White House meetings ranged over scores of questions besides these. At times, as many as 20 people were in the Cabinet Room. The cast of characters changed according to the particular question being considered. At one point, the President talked by telephone with Dwight Eisenhower, filled him in on the talks.

Throughout the week, Johnson fired question after question--by actual count, more than 100 during a single two-hour period--at his advisers. He asked military men to comment on political questions and political advisers to comment on military matters. He was especially interested in finding out from McNamara about the Viet Cong guerrillas. What are they like? How is their morale? What kind of intelligence information is the U.S. getting from prisoners? Many times the President referred to maps and photographs showing damage both inflicted by and suffered by U.S. forces. The matter of casualties came up time and time again. One adviser expressed concern about the fact that casualty figures will grow. Replied the President: "The 48 men we lost last week already are a worry to me."

Details of the decisions arising from the war council would not be known until this week, when Johnson was expected to announce them on television. But he was clearly determined to provide an affirmative answer to the question he recently posed in remarks to a visitor. Said he: "The Communists are pouring more men in all the time. They've suffered their greatest losses. The big question that we are faced with is whether the United States is doing what it ought to do."

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