The Backlash from Q-29BW

At the Ontario Hydro-Electric Commission operations center in suburban Toronto, a technician twisted a control handle to the right to raise the voltage. In the next three seconds, the $265 million 16-turbine Sir Adam Beck Generating Station No. 2 (see map) sent 1,600,000 kw. of power careering out of control through 80,000 sq. mi. of the northeastern U.S. and Canada. Thus, at 5:16 p.m. on Black Tuesday, began history's biggest power failure (TIME cover, Nov. 19).

It was no fault of the technician. The disruption began, Ontario Hydro explained last week, when a backup relay --a breadbox-size fuse--blew on power line Q-29BW after Ontario had been requested by Syracuse to up the voltage. The blowout disconnected the line from service; when Q-29BW's load transferred automatically to four other trunk lines running westward out of Beck, they were knocked out as well. With no place to go, the peak-hour power buildup reversed its flow, cascaded eastward through two 230,000-volt tie lines across Niagara Gorge. In a wave that lasted only five-sixths of a second, the wild wattage surged into New York State, knocking out the Niagara Falls-Massena main line three seconds later.

The collapse of the Lake Ontario loop pulled to the rescue a massive 1,500,000 kw. from New York City plus power from New England members of CANUSE, the vast power grid serving northeastern America. Within minutes their systems also went dead.

Why? Ontario Hydro officials said that they could find no mechanical defect in Q-29BW's backup fuse. Then why did it blow? The question created a behind-the-scenes divergence between U.S. and Canadian power experts. Privately, American officials expressed doubts about the design of the backup relay system in service at the Beck plant. But Ontario Hydro officials claimed that its protective safeguards were comparable to those in use on U.S. high-voltage lines. Robert H. Hillery, Ontario Hydro's operations director, insisted that the disconnect-setting of Beck's backup fuses "was well above the load we were carrying." Hillery conceded nonetheless: "We'll need some different kind of relay--something more selective than we've had."

Power experts were still at odds over ways of preventing a single malfunction from pulling down an entire grid. Though FPC Chairman Joseph Swidler was preparing a report for President Johnson, final recommendations will take more intensive studies. Meanwhile, there were signs that Congress will be asked to tighten FPC's police powers. Next week a special House Commerce subcommittee investigating the blackout will hold its first meeting in Washington.

Insurance for Future. One incontrovertible lesson imparted by the blackout was that more independent auxiliary power units are needed for use in such emergencies. The Federal Aviation Agency rushed four backup generators from an Oklahoma City warehouse to New York City's airports, where the runways were out of commission during the critical hours. Simultaneously, the FAA fired off telegrams to the nation's 25 major airports requesting them to specify what standby equipment they need to ensure continued operation. In New York City, 13 hospitals made plans to purchase emergency power units; two of the hospitals had already earmarked nearly $4,000,000 for the purpose.

Elsewhere throughout the blackout area, police and fire stations, office buildings, stores--and not a few of its 30 million individual inhabitants--were spending untold thousands of dollars for auxiliary equipment ranging from generators to flashlights. They may well have to use them.

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