The Duty to Defy

None of the other legislative aims outlined in President Johnson's State of the Union message drew such enthusiastic applause from Congress as his proposal to amend the Constitution so as to give Representatives four-year terms. While formidable opposition was expected in the Senate, most thought that the House would approve quadrennial elections. Last week, in hearings before the House Judiciary Committee, it was clear that the Representatives had had second thoughts.

At issue, of course, is the proper balance between the President and the Congress--a constitutional question as old as the Republic. In testimony before the committee, Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach contended without dispute that two-year terms force most Representatives to campaign year-round, to the neglect of their legislative duties. No one denied his argument that two years is hardly time enough to gain background for the deluge of bills--11,856 in 1965 alone--that demand a Representative's consideration.

Power Loss. Also unquestioned was Katzenbach's observation that electing Representatives only in presidential years would give the President a more cooperative House and lessen the chance of crippling legislative stalemates, such as those that stymied Herbert Hoover when Democrats took over the lower chamber in 1931 and Harry Truman when Republicans took command in 1947. Only once in this century--in 1934--has the presidential party not lost strength during off-year elections.

Yet the notion of greater cooperation with the President also bothers many Congressmen, who feel that the legislative branch has already lost too much power to the executive. "I can't imagine a better argument against the proposal than that," retorted Virginia Republican Richard Poff, a onetime supporter of the amendment. "I think it is the function of the legislative branch to defy, when necessary, the executive, to resist soli darity with it."

Rump Groups. Committee Chairman Emanuel Celler, serving his 22nd term, made another point by reading to Katzenbach a passage from Madison's Federalist Papers urging "frequent elections" for House members to ensure their "immediate dependency" on the people.

A possible compromise would be to stagger the terms so that half the House would be elected with the President, half in off-year elections. However, Katzenbach made clear that the Administration would not accept this solution, fearing that it might split each party in the House into two rump groups, one a "presidential" party, the other an "off-year" faction free to ignore its own "presidential banner and platform." Said he: "A cure, to be a cure, cannot be worse than the malady."

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