A Step Toward Sharing

One of Charles de Gaulle's chief criticisms of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is that the U.S. might not respond with its full nuclear power if a Communist aggressor attacked Europe. In London last week, the U.S. and four key NATO partners agreed to a new plan that seemed aimed at refuting the French objection. It calls for a chain of commands across Europe to give Washington's remaining 13 NATO partners a joint voice in the target selection and firing of 6,000 tactical nuclear warheads, which the U.S. has placed in Europe for NATO defense. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and his West German, Italian, and Turkish counterparts also endorsed a British proposal that the Atlantic Alliance must be prepared to "escalate its nuclear response rather than accept defeat in a European war."

Fears of a Gap. Still unsolved was another problem of the NATO crisis: the fate of the two French army divisions and two air wings now stationed in West Germany. When De Gaulle withdraws his forces from NATO on July 1, will his soldiers stay across the Rhine or go home? Understandably, the Germans are loathe to see the French forces pull out and leave a gap in the NATO armor. De Gaulle, of course, would like to leave French forces in Germany under the old occupation status. To gain leverage on the Germans, Paris has hinted that if French troops withdraw from West Germany, they might also withdraw from Berlin.

Chancellor Ludwig Erhard refuses to be bullied. "There can be no throwback to occupation status," he declared in Berlin last week. "Nor will we abandon our position that French troops [in West Germany] must have a definite task within defense planning." A tripartite group of British, West German and U.S. diplomats last week produced a paper that said much the same thing; it will serve as Bonn's bargaining position in next month's talks with the French. Erhard hopes that the 27,000 French troops in Germany will remain on station, linked unilaterally with the West Germans in the present NATO chain of command.

Under the Umbrella. Such a plan would have advantages for the French. For one thing, it would give them continued access to the American tactical nuclear warheads in West Germany, which France now shares under the NATO "two-key" system. For another, it would enable France to keep troops in Germany, which, in French minds at least, serves to dampen the resurgence of their old enemy's aggressive spirit. Whether De Gaulle will be impressed by those considerations remains to be seen. Despite his vocal "suspicion" of American intentions in Europe, he is nonetheless counting on the U.S. to shield France from aggression no matter how much mischief he stirs up. He admitted as much in a recent meeting with Erhard. When the Chancellor protested that "we cannot live without the protection of the U.S.," De Gaulle replied blandly: "Neither can we."

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