Static of Distress

Wherever they looked last week, the leaders of North Viet Nam saw trouble. To the north, Red China was convulsed by violence. Below the 17th parallel, the U.S. and its allies were preparing a knockout blow against the Communist "main force" units, which were already reeling from 1966 losses of 50,000 men in combat and 20,000 defectors.

To make the view from Hanoi even bleaker, U.S. Marines began their long-anticipated offensive against the Mekong Delta, the Reds' last safe haven in South Viet Nam. Perhaps most disturbing of all to the enemy was the U.S. air war. During the week, the North Vietnamese lost nine supersonic MIG-21s, their most advanced fighter aircraft, as U.S. bombers continued to pound military targets. Seemingly desperate for relief from the devastating air offensive, Hanoi began emitting some subtle static aimed at convincing Washington that if only the U.S. would call off its planes, peace talks might--eventually--get under way.

Le Patron. The first signal came during New York Timesman Harrison Salisbury's four-hour interview with North Viet Nam's Premier Pham Van Dong, whom some observers regard as le patron--the real boss--of the war effort. According to Salisbury, Pham emphasized that his oft-reiterated "four points"* for settlement of the war were not meant as prior "conditions" for peace talks but as a "basis of settlement." Since Hanoi had hitherto insisted that the U.S. had to accept these terms before talks could begin, the apparent shift in emphasis stirred a flurry of speculation. Was Pham softening his position and saying that the four points were merely proposals that Hanoi would toss on the negotiating table? Well, not exactly. Pham, said Hanoi radio by way of non-clarification, meant that these items were not merely "a" basis for settling the war but "the" basis. And Pham offered no alternative to Hanoi's unacceptable conditions.

United Nations Secretary-General U Thant caused a fresh flurry of speculation when the New York Times reported that he had come up with "hard facts of a positive response from North Viet Nam" should the U.S. end the bombing. If so, that was news to the White House. "I know of no response from any source," said Press Secretary Bill Moyers in rare bureaucratese, "that indicates a willingness on the part of North Viet Nam to respect the reciprocity aspect of that proposition"--meaning that Hanoi has not once proposed to cut back its own war effort.

Still another signal flashed from Paris. There, Mai Van Bo, head of Hanoi's diplomatic mission, said that if the U.S. stopped bombing the North and then suggested peace talks, "I believe this proposal would be examined and studied." However, added Mai, the U.S. should expect "no reciprocity whatever" for stopping the bombing.

More than Halfway. Though the signals were confusing at best, U.S. officials took pains to explore every opening. "We are willing to meet them more than halfway," said Lyndon Johnson in a year-end press conference, "if there is any indication of movement on their part." Secretary of State Dean Rusk made a similar point in his reply to a letter from 100 student leaders who asked him to clarify U.S. policies on Viet Nam (TIME, Jan. 6).

"We stand ready--now and at any time in the future--to sit down with representatives of Hanoi, either in public or in secret, to work out arrangements for a just solution," said Rusk. He also deplored the fact that civilian casualties had resulted from U.S. raids against military targets in the North, but noted: "I would remind you that tens of thousands of civilians have been killed, wounded or kidnaped in South Viet Nam, not by accident but as a result of a deliberate policy of terrorism and intimidation by the Viet Cong."

Quid pro Nil. It was difficult not to conclude that Hanoi's aim is to induce Washington to end bombing of the North on a quid pro nil basis. Thant has already urged the U.S. to "show an enlightened and humanitarian spirit" by calling off the raids, "even without conditions," and the pressure from European capitals is intense. Said a U.S. official: "If Ho Chi Minh announces that his representatives are on their way to Geneva to meet with us, the pressure to stop bombing would be tremendous and perhaps irresistible." The Administration nonetheless is bent on resisting that pressure until the day when Hanoi unequivocally signals its willingness to negotiate on bona fide terms.

* The points, announced by Pham on April 8, 1965: 1) recognition of Viet Nam's independence, sovereignty and unity, and withdrawal of U.S. forces from the South; 2) no military alliances with foreign countries for either North or South; 3) settlement of South Viet Nam's affairs "in accordance with the program" of the National Liberation Front, the Viet Cong's political arm; and 4) achievement of reunification by the Vietnamese people without foreign interference.

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