A Fragile Web

Since the Geneva accords of 1962 established its tripartite "neutrality," the landlocked, Lilliputian kingdom of Laos has teetered continually on the cliff-edge of chaos. Torn between the demands of the rightist Royal Laotian Army and the intransigent Communist Pathet Lao, which controls nearly half of the country, Neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma maintains a facade of government simply because he is the only Premier acceptable to both the West and the Communist powers. Last week, when Laotians went to the polls to elect a new National Assembly in the first countrywide elections since 1960, foreign observers from a dozen capitals from Moscow to Washington waited nervously for the outcome in the sleepy capital of Vientiane. They had good reason to be nervous: a defeat for the courtly, autocratic Souvanna would almost certainly precipitate another major Southeast Asian crisis to complicate the war in Viet Nam.

Battle Refuge. Sparsely populated Laos (2,500,000 people) has little of value to fight over. But it is strategically situated at the axis of six other nations with which it shares common borders: Red China, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, and North and South Viet Nam. Through the eastern half of Laos, controlled by the Pathet Lao, stretches the Ho Chi Minh trail, over which the North Vietnamese regularly infiltrate South Viet Nam. More than 75,000 North Vietnamese troops are now on Laotian soil, between 20,000 and 30,000 of them combat troops and the rest antiaircraft units, engineers and construction workers. North Vietnamese troops operating in South Viet Nam frequently use Laos as a refuge to escape from attack, and some of them mix with the Pathet Lao during periodic attacks on the Royal Laotian Army.

Bad as this situation is, the U.S. prefers it to resumption of the open conflict that rent the country before the 1962 Geneva settlement; the Communists also prefer the status quo to any upset that would enlarge the Southeast Asian war and perhaps bring U.S. troops into Laos. If Souvanna Phouma were to fall, both sides would find it extremely difficult to agree on a successor. An impasse might cause the Red bloc to recognize Pathet Lao Leader Prince Souphanouvong, Souvanna's half brother, as the ruler of Laos--thus almost certainly thrusting Laos directly into open war.

Caught in a Vise. Souvanna Phouma did not have to fear the Communists in the elections: the Pathet Lao boycotted them. His strongest opposition came from the rightist south, where portly Prince Boun Oum--his predecessor as Premier until 1962--was attempting a comeback with the aid of southern army commanders and Deputy Premier Leuam Insisiengmay. Souvanna also faced trouble in the north, where Guerrilla Leader Vang Pao had picked his own candidates, afraid that the military rightists led by General Kouprasith Abhay, Souvanna's chief backer, would become too powerful and attempt to bring his anti-Communist Meo tribesmen under Royal Army control.

Caught in a regional vise, Souvanna first attempted to create a National United Front Party embracing all ideological elements, but was blocked by Deputy Premier Leuam, who feared that the party would fall into leftist control. "There was no platform, no common ideology," said Leuam. "I could not possibly join it." Thwarted from both left and right, Souvanna was forced to allow more than 150 candidates for 59 National Assembly seats to run as independents--who might or might not back him if elected. He hedged the danger by weaving a complex web of alliances and patronage promises, then sat back to await the results. The night before the election, he invited 1,500 guests to a white-tie party at which the deadliest enemies ate and drank and gave each other the long Lao handshake that can last through an entire conversation.

More Magnanimous. Into the polling places--Buddhist temples, tin-roofed schools, thatched jungle huts--swarmed 420,000 of the electorate. Somehow, Souvanna's web held. By week's end more than 30 of his supporters were elected, giving him a clear majority. In dismissing the previous Assembly for refusing to approve his budget, Souvanna had declared: "If the next Assembly is no better than the last, then I shall get rid of it." After the elections, though, he felt magnanimous. At a Vientiane news conference that included Russians, Americans and Red Chinese, he said: "I believe the new Deputies will work with me. If so, we can hope that the relative peace we have enjoyed for the past three years will continue and we will not be dragged into total war."

Still, loyalties are never long-lived in Laos, and Souvanna's fragile web of alliances--of groups loyal to the top ten ruling families, to the military and to other regional powers besides himself--could easily rip. Fiery Neutralist General Kong Le, who fled Laos after a dustup over dragons' eggs (TIME, Oct. 21), was in Indonesia and uneasily noncommittal. Army Commander Kouprasith, who has his own ambitions for Laos, was enigmatically silent. A lot would depend on how Souvanna Phouma and the new Assembly get along together after it convenes in early February.

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