Listening to Bubbles from Hanoi

Never in the two arduous years since the U.S. began its major buildup in Viet Nam has official Washington wavered so palpably between hope and skepticism about the prospects of ending the war. The hope was based on an almost extrasensory feeling that there is a change in the air, that Hanoi might be softening its intransigence toward peace talks. The skepticism reflected the fact that North Viet Nam has yet to make a single tangible overture toward negotiations.

Groundless as they might prove, the glimmerings of hope were remarkably prevalent last week. Bill Moyers, departing the White House press office for his new job as a newspaper publisher, said: "We can smell something. We don't know what it is, but there is something there." Maxwell Taylor, reporting to the President on his first trip back to Saigon since his 1965 resignation as U.S. ambassador there, agreed. "Something," he said, "is starting to move."

Senator Robert Kennedy predicted that the weeks ahead would prove "critical and crucial." And the New York Times's Harrison Salisbury, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about his two-week stay in North Viet Nam last month, expressed the conviction that Hanoi, increasingly unsure of Peking's aid, is "ready to talk business."

"Could Be." If the optimism had any visible attachment to fact, it was by a frail thread of innuendo spun by Hanoi's Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh in an interview with Newsman Wilfred Burchett, an Australian-born Communist, who has long been a mouthpiece for Asian Reds but has been more attuned to the Moscow line than to that of Peking. The key to Trinh's position was his well-hedged sentence: "It is only after the unconditional cessation of U.S. bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV [Democratic Republic of Viet Nam] that there could be talks between the DRV and the U.S."

Though the words were carefully conditional and hardly conciliatory, several governments with consulates in Hanoi were advised by the Communists that it was a "semaphoric" statement. Accordingly, they relayed to Washington the implication that an American bombing halt might result in peace talks. U.S. Hanoi-watchers were quick to note that the "could be" statement did not once refer to North Viet Nam's oft-repeated four-point conditions for negotiations; in particular, it did not mention the Viet Cong as a full-fledged negotiating partner from the start. Beyond that, there was a great deal of conjecture about several imponderables that may indeed be pushing North Viet Nam toward the conference table:

> The upheaval in Red China could jeopardize Peking's will and means to support North Viet Nam's war effort.

> Hanoi's own ability to prosecute the war may have been severely eroded by the relentless punishment it has taken from the air.

> Russia and its European allies are unhappy over the cost of the war--which they have helped to defray to the extent of perhaps $2 billion in the past decade--and may be increasing the pressure on Hanoi to make a settlement.

> The markedly more stable political situation in Saigon, added to the military setbacks suffered by the Viet Cong, may indicate to the North that it cannot hope to win through outright conquest.

No Trade. Whatever the realities, the Johnson Administration was playing a cautious game. Five times at his mid-week press conference, the President rephrased and repeated the same cautious litany: "In all candor, I must say that I am not aware of any serious effort that the other side has made, in my judgment, to bring the fighting to a stop."

In real terms, the U.S. was not about to trade a quitclaim on bombing for pacific intimations from Hanoi. If the raids were unilaterally halted once more with no sign of any reciprocal deescalation by Hanoi, Washington is fearful of what might follow. If it then became necessary to resume the raids, the Administration fears a vociferous reaction from the American people--both from disappointed doves and do-or-die hawks--as well as from governments around the world.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk took pains last week to make the point that it would be tactically foolish for the U.S. to suspend bombing unconditionally. In an interview on British television, the Secretary warned: "We need to know what is going to happen if we stop bombing. Otherwise, North Viet Nam could sit there safe and comfortable, perhaps for the next 50 years, continuing its efforts to send in men and supplies."

Carbonation. Behind all the public pronouncements there is the fact that Washington is engaged in an intricate, intensive effort to probe what exactly North Viet Nam has to offer in return for U.S. concessions. One hopeful indication, despite the absence of overt signals from Hanoi, is the very caution with which the Administration publicly treats any possibility of discussions. In nearly every crisis since the end of World War II, the groundwork for ultimate settlement has been laid in the utmost secrecy. In the case of Viet Nam, a secret diplomatic dialogue might possibly lead to a full-dress series of public conferences. Or it could lead to a de facto withering away of the conflict.

After repeated flurries of hope and subsequent frustration, Administration Hanoi-watchers have come to define the present situation as "effervescence," a state of diplomatic ferment. Despite past disappointments, Washington and the world are closely analyzing the bubbles from Hanoi to see whether they are merely propaganda carbonation or signs of a substantive change of temper in North Viet Nam.

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