Friday, Mar. 03, 1967

Haves v. Have-Nots

The nightmare of diplomats is a vision of dozens of countries of every size and temperament in possession of the nuclear bomb. This nightmare haunts the U.S. and the Soviet Union most of all, since together they have the overwhelming majority of the weapons and an acute realization of the unimaginable destruction that they could work. In recent months the two nations have put together a draft treaty that would limit nuclear weapons to countries that already have them and ask all others to forgo an atomic arsenal. Last week, as the diplomats of 18 nations gathered in Geneva to discuss the non-proliferation treaty, a bitter disagreement broke out between the nuclear haves and the have-nots--especially those eight or ten have-nots that already possess the know-how and materials to produce a bomb if they wish to.

Major Miscalculation. The Soviet Union, with a few demurrers, generally goes along with the U.S. version of the treaty, which is only some 800 words long. The U.S. draft prohibits the manufacture of nuclear explosives by havenots, establishes a control system through the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency to make sure that no reactor fuel is diverted to weapon-making, guarantees to all signatories of the pact the cooperation of the nuclear powers in such peaceful activities as canal blasting or mountain removal, and extends security guarantees to the non-nuclear powers. It also argues that NATO does not violate the non-proliferation concept by allowing non-nuclear allies to help select targets and asserts that if Europe united politically it would be entitled to its own nuclear strike force.

The U.S. and the Soviet Union at first believed that they could get the other countries to go along with such a treaty without too much trouble, but they badly miscalculated how deep emotions run on nuclear subjects. Many of the smaller powers feel that the treaty is unfair and one-sided. India and Sweden asked why the have-nots should give up their right to bombs if the haves give up nothing in return. West Germany, which believes that it has the potential to be second only to the U.S. in building and selling reactors, fears that the treaty would handicap its nuclear development. Furthermore, the West Germans are afraid that the Russians would use the inspection clause to pry into West German plants, disrupt important research on the ground that it violated the treaty, and filch patents. The treaty, said Franz Josef Strauss, leader of the Bavarian branch of the Christian Democrats, "is a new Yalta of cosmic proportions,"--harking back to the wartime conference in which the Americans and Russians decided the fate of postwar Europe.

Industrial Muscle. While the U.S. and the Soviet Union have sufficient oil and coal for their power needs, many of the have-not powers see in nuclear energy their first opportunity to tap a power source that will allow them to develop real industrial muscle. What most worries the have-nots is that the treaty's stipulations might impede their atomic progress; what most worries the U.S. and Russia is that each advance brings the have-nots closer to an atomic-weaponry potential. West Germany has a new "fast-breeder" reactor that generates electricity--and produces enough plutonium to build 36 A-bombs of Hiroshima firepower per year. According to some estimates, India's one existing reactor and three abuilding ones will make enough fissionable fuel for India to produce 15 bombs of 20-kiloton strength by 1990. France has six reactors, Italy three, Japan two and Sweden one. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, nearly 10% of the world's electricity will be supplied by nuclear reactors in 1980.

The U.S. and Russia insist that the treaty would not restrict the peaceful development of atomic energy and that they would share any peaceful scientific fallout from their nuclear-weaponry programs. As with the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, France and Red China are not expected to sign the non-proliferation treaty. The Americans and Russians hope that they will be able to persuade the have-nots to put aside their hesitations and go along with the treaty, but expect that the job of persuasion will take at least to fall, when they hope that the United Nations will take up the question of nuclear nonproliferation.

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