The LOGLAND Jam

If Defense Secretary Robert McNamara has his way, the U.S. by 1970 will be able to speed American-based troops within hours to any trouble spot in the world. Key to McNamara's "rapid deployment concept" is an expanded airlift capacity centered on the C-141 StarLifter and the mammoth C-5A jet transport now abuilding at Lockheed's plant in Marietta, Ga. Equally important, if less spectacular, are the Fast Deployment Logistics Ships (FDLS) needed to haul the Army's tanks and trucks, artillery and ammunition, and "marry up" with the airborne troops. Last week the seaborne segment of McNamara's grand strategy was rudely jolted. The Senate Armed Services Committee issued a report aimed at torpedoing the $2 billion FDLS program before the first of its 30 ships ever reached the ways.

Policing the World? Challenging the cost of the program, the report noted that the FDLS, when deployed in forward areas, would require additional investment in both antisubmarine and antiaircraft escort vessels. But the committee's main objections, reflecting the paradoxical attitude of Chairman Richard Russell--who helped steer the $2 billion C-5A contract to his native Georgia-were that 30 civilian-manned ships would create the impression abroad that the U.S. "has assumed the function of policing the world."

The Pentagon retorted that the Navy already has 1,000 ships deployed around the world, but that the mere existence of this force has never swayed U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, as envisioned by McNamara, the FDLS fleet, like the airlift, would act as a deterrent to potential aggression: it would arrive at a trouble spot before the outbreak of war, thus would not require massive military escort. If the shooting had already started, all transports would have to be convoyed in any case. To critics who claim that airlift alone can do the job, the Pentagon points out that an additional complement of C-5As to haul the materiel would cost three times as much as the FDLS.

Pressing the Fight. In any of the three designs currently under consideration, it will be a fast (25 knots), big ship: some 40,000 tons (v. the liner United States's 52,000), 880 ft. long and 105 ft. in beam, allowing ready passage through the 110-ft.-wide Panama Canal. From a stern ramp, the FDLS will be able to roll off its 10,000 tons of cargo in ten hours at dockside, 20 hours over the beach. Up forward the FDLS will mount high-speed booms to handle 15 days' worth of supplies (ammo and food); aft of the superstructure will be a huge helipad to handle CH-54A Skycranes (for helicopter liftoff) and up to 500 fueled and flyable combat choppers.

Despite the Senate Committee's recommendation that this year's funding of $289 million for FDLS be cut and the program halted, McNamara will press the fight in the House, where he has greater support. As ammunition against the critics, he has data from 17 reports compiled since 1964 by LOGLAND ("Logistics Support for Land Operations") and other Pentagon committees that strongly advocate the FDLS program. The reports show that McNamara's flexible response strategy would by its very speed alone slash the duration of conflicts by half, cut casualties to the U.S. and its allies and vastly reduce the amount of friendly territory that would have to be recaptured. Those considerations alone should ultimately clear the jam in LOGLAND.

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