Playing the Patsy

Though the 1967 baseball season got under way last week -- with President Johnson tossing out no fewer than three balls at Washington's D.C. Stadium to make it official -- the cry of "Strike!" meant considerably more to most Americans than a waist-high pitch right over the plate. It meant wildcat walkouts by Teamsters and a retaliatory lockout by employers that held up two-thirds of the nation's truck-borne freight. It meant Huntley without Brinkley, at least until the 13-day TV-radio strike was settled. It meant the prospect of a newspaperless New York City for the fourth time in four years and of work stoppages by 12,300 Western Electric workers and 75,000 rubberworkers. Above all, it meant the threat of a nationwide rail strike.

Bargaining Tool. Nothing could cripple the complex economy of the U.S. more swiftly or spectacularly than a rail strike. In a month-long walkout, the President told Congress last week, unemployment would rocket from the current 3.6% level to 15%, and the gross national product would plummet by nearly $100 billion--after a first quarter during which the $764 billion-a-year G.N.P. failed to show any substantial growth for the first time since 1961. Some 750,000 New York, Philadelphia and Chicago commuters would be stranded, and Defense Department shipments would be cut by as much as 40% --including more than 80% of the ammunition destined for overseas points.

Plainly the President could not--and, as he made it clear last week, would not --permit a rail strike. The question was how to avoid it. As of last week, the Administration had exhausted the 60-day no-strike injunctions provided under the Railroad Labor Act. To prevent 137,000 workers in six shopcraft unions from tying up 138 railroads by taking a walk, Johnson had to request special legislation from Congress extending the strike deadline by 20 days. By margins of 81 to 1 in the Senate and 396 to 8 in the House, he got what he wanted--but Congress was clearly unhappy about it. Even those who approved the measure objected to what New Hampshire Democrat Thomas Mclntyre, the Senate's lone dissenter, called the "use of Congress as a tool in bargaining."

As soon as the President signed the bill the shopcraft unions announced that they would observe the congressional ban but would strike at 12:01 a.m. on May 3, the moment the extension expires. Neither the railroads nor the unions showed any inclination to budge from their bargaining positions. The railroads were offering a 5% pay hike while the shopcraft unions sought 7%.

At the Tolerable Edge. To Administration officials, 5% settlements are "right at the tolerable edge" as far as their inflationary impact is concerned. Nonetheless, when the Teamsters reportedly won a 5% boost after 1,500 trucking firms halted their three-day lockout, they were not noticeably elated. For three days, Teamsters in Chicago struck for a 90-c--an-hour boost instead of an hourly increase in wages and fringes totaling 600 to 700 over a three-year period, as accepted by the national union. In its talks this fall, covering 775,000 workers, the United Auto Workers union is expected "to go quite high," as an Administration economist puts it, placing further strains on the economy.

The rash of disputes in basic industries spurred public demands for some mechanism that would preserve collective bargaining without repeatedly dislocating the U.S. economy. President Johnson promised 15 months ago to propose legislation to "deal with strikes which threaten irreparable damage to the national interest." Fearful of alienating labor, whose most credible weapon is still the strike, he has yet to do so. But Congress, understandably, is growing weary of playing the patsy every time the President is confronted with a potentially disruptive strike.

In 1963, John F. Kennedy turned to Congress to intervene with special one-shot legislation to prevent a rail strike. Last year Congress was at the point of legislating against the airline strike when the two sides settled it themselves. With the May 3 rail strike looming, Johnson faces such alternatives as compulsory arbitration or Government seizure of the railroads--both unpalatable to a man who has been strongly backed by labor in past elections. Instead of taking either step, the President is expected to ask Congress for legislation barring the strike. Congress has little choice except to carry the ball for the President still another time, but its patience is growing thin.

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