Reforming Juvenile Justice

Throughout the U.S., juvenile courts are an entity unto themselves. They have their own rules and regulations, and in most cases they answer to no higher authority. Until its current session, the U.S. Supreme Court had never even reviewed a state juvenile court case. But last week, by an 8-to-1 majority, the court ruled that it is time for juvenile courts to grow up. "Neither the 14th Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone," said Justice Abe Fortas for the majority. "Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court."

Poor Substitute. The case in point, In the Matter of Gault, concerned a young Arizona boy, Gerald Gault, who three years ago was accused of telephoning a neighboring housewife and making what the court called "remarks or questions of the irritatingly offensive, adolescent, sex variety." The woman who claimed to have been called never appeared at any hearing. Neither Gerald nor his parents were advised of any right to counsel or of his right to keep silent. They had little or no advance notice of the charges against him. No transcript was kept of the proceedings, and no appeal was possible. It took a writ of habeas corpus to get any sort of review. The offense was punishable by a maximum of two months and $50 if Gerald had been an adult. Since he was only 15, however, he could be and was committed to the State Industrial School until he turned 21.

Such treatment was not unique to Gerald or to Arizona. In 1899, recalled Fortas, Illinois reformers established the first juvenile court system in the nation, and it was soon imitated by every state as well as by other countries. The intention was not to punish children but to "treat" them, and the presiding judge was given great latitude. "The highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to the system," said the court. "But in practice, juvenile court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure."

Kindly Judge. What fundamentally disturbed the majority was the fact that "however euphemistic the title, the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time in an institution of confinement. In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase 'due process.' " Accordingly, the court ruled that an accused juvenile is entitled to timely notice of the charges. He must be given the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him. For his hearing to be fair, he must also be told of his right to counsel--a court-appointed counsel if he is indigent--and he must be told of his right to remain silent.

The lone dissenter,* Justice Stewart, surprisingly made no mention of the possibility that countless minors now in custody may well be entitled to quick release. He did argue, however, that the court was inviting "a long step backward into the 19th century," an era when "there were no juvenile proceedings, and a child was tried in a conventional criminal court." In anticipation of that objection, the majority carefully noted that it was not suggesting that juvenile courts needed to change in every respect. It will still be acceptable for the courts to keep a juvenile's record secret to protect him, though many have not in fact done so. He can still be classified as a delinquent instead of a criminal. A record of delinquency need not "operate as a civil disability or disqualify him for civil service appointment" any more than it does already. And "nothing will require that the conception of the kindly juvenile judge be replaced by its opposite."

* Justices Black and White concurred in separate opinions; Justice Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part.

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