Inquest for Liberty

ARMED FORCES

In the early June afternoon the east ern Mediterranean sky was clear, the sea calm. The U.S. Navy communications ship Liberty, a converted Victory freighter, was steaming west-northwesterly at five knots, about 14 nautical miles off the Sinai Peninsula. Seconds later, lookouts sighted jet fighters bearing in from the southeast at 7,000 ft. A rocket slammed into Liberty's port side amidships, igniting two 55-gal. gasoline drums; a bomb struck the starboard side. The planes, sweeping down in teams of two or more, raked the ship with crisscross rocket and machine-gun fire, riddling hull and superstructure with 821 hits.

No sooner had the planes retired than three PT boats appeared from the northeast, spraying Liberty with machine-gun fire and launching two torpedoes, one of which found its target. It tore a 39-ft. wound amidships below the water line.

Fragmentary Answers. The attacks ended 35 min. later, leaving 34 officers and crewmen dead, 75 wounded and two large questions unanswered. Why was Liberty, a sophisticated U.S. electronic spy ship monitoring both sides' communications during the Arab-Israeli war, cruising so close to the battle zone? Why did the Israelis go out of their way to attack a neutral ship?

Last week, after a seven-day secret investigation, a Navy court of inquiry offered only fragmentary answers. Its summary pointed out that "U.S.S. Liberty was in international waters, properly marked as to her identity." A 5-ft. by 8-ft. U.S. flag flew at the masthead, must surely have been seen by three separate Israeli planes that surveyed the ship during the morning. Her name was lettered on the stern in English, which could hardly have been confused with the Arabic script on Egyptian ships. "The court produced evidence that the Israeli armed forces had ample opportunity to identify Liberty correctly," said the summary. But it added: "The court had insufficient information before it to make a judgment on the reasons for the decision by Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats to attack."

Holiday Ensign. Navy people had an unofficial explanation. The spotter planes in the morning correctly identified Liberty, they maintain, and Israeli intelligence in Tel Aviv even looked her up in Jane's Fighting Ships. But the word did not reach all patrolling jet pilots and PT commanders, who expected to find only Israeli or Egyptian ships in the area. Since Liberty bears a slight resemblance to the Egyptian supply ship El Quseir, the Israeli commanders attacked. Liberty's U.S. flag was shot away during the air attack and the "holiday ensign" (7 ft. by 13 ft.) run up to replace it as the attackers bore in was obscured by flames and smoke. After their torpedo run, Israeli PT-boat commanders evidently realized their mistake and stopped astern of Liberty to signal: "Do you need assistance?" When

Premier Levi Eshkol learned of the attack, he wired apologies to Washington, and offered amends for "the tragic loss of life and material damage."

Ironically, the court reported that "early on the 8th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had issued orders for Liberty to move farther from the coast, even though such a move would partially degrade her mission"--a mission never explained in the summary. The messages "were misrouted, delayed and not received until after the attack." More over, only three days earlier the Israelis had asked the Pentagon what ships it might have in the area in the coming week. Because of some mix-up they got no reply, and apparently decided that the U.S. Navy was not operating in the area. After spotting Liberty, Israeli pilots and PT-boat skippers evidently concluded that they were attacking a disguised Egyptian ship.

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