Judicious Dribs & Drabs

The President's decision, arrived at after several days of anxious contemplation, was a typically Johnsonian compromise. There will be more American troops in Viet Nam at the end of this year than originally scheduled, but not so many as General Westmoreland wanted.

There are now 465,000 U.S. service men there, and another 25,000 have long since been tagged to go. With allowances for anticipated casualties, that would have given Westmoreland a total force of 480,000 troops by Jan. 1 . Now the timetable has been accelerated. The 480,000 mark will be reached by mid-October, 2 1/2 months ahead of schedule.

What Westmoreland was asking for was three additional divisions, totaling 120,000 men, by mid-1968. He apparently is only going to get 70,000 to 80,000 men -- in "dribs and drabs," as one U.S. officer put it -- over the next 18 months. Thus the maximum U.S. strength in Viet Nam is now visualized as around 550,000 men by the end of next year, if necessary -- and L.B.J. of course continues to hope the maximum won't be necessary.

The bigger and faster buildup that Westmoreland wanted was unpalatable to the President for domestic reasons, but he was also unpersuaded that it was essential to our effort in Viet Nam. It would have required mobilization of some reserves, and that would have been extremely expensive. Momentarily, the President is expected to renew his January request for a 6% surtax on personal and corporate income taxes, in hopes of whittling down the big budgetary deficit anticipated for the current fiscal year. Calling up the Reserves could have forced him to peg the surtax closer to 10%.

Boys on Bikes. It was in this situation that Johnson sent Defense Secretary Robert McNamara to Saigon two weeks ago for his ninth visit in six years. Briskly making the rounds, from battered Marine camps near the Demilitarized Zone to Army installations in the marshy Mekong Delta, McNamara probed two questions over and over: Were field commanders overestimating Communist strength? Were the Allied forces on hand being used at something less than maximum effectiveness? Rather early in his five-day visit, it became plain that the Secretary thought the answer to both questions was yes.

Some officers in Westmoreland's command have put out figures indicating that the enemy's total strength has risen from 280,000 to 296,000 in the past six months. But these totals include administrative cadres, line-of-supply forces and part-time guerrillas, and there is endless room for argument about definitions as well as the count. Saigon headquarters sometimes uses the highest possible figures on enemy strength in support of arguments for more U.S. troops, then is naively surprised when the U.S. public figures the war can't be going very well if the enemy keeps getting statistically stronger.

McNamara believes the Allies, with more than 1,200,000 men in Viet Nam,* could make do with what they have--if more men could be relieved of support jobs and assigned to combat. The Defense Secretary, like most other visitors and students of the war, has been particularly troubled by the failure of the Vietnamese to increase the effectiveness of their forces. Another thing bothered him. "Why," he demanded, "aren't all those long-haired kids I see riding around town on motorbikes in the Army?" The Vietnamese were not exactly encouraging in their reply. Waiting until McNamara had departed, Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu called a news conference to explain that the country already has an inordinate number of men in uniform. Besides, he added, it takes time to train new soldiers, and money to equip them, and Saigon cannot invest either without seriously imperiling its economy. "We don't need a general mobilization," said Thieu. The boys on the motorbikes appeared safe.

Realistic Figure. As for the U.S. forces, some officers in Saigon threw out the misleading information that no more than 75,000 troops were actually available for combat. But Pentagon sources quickly pointed out that the figure failed to include artillerymen, engineers, signalmen, reconnaissance men and helicopter crewmen--none of them infantrymen, true, but all of them combat forces nevertheless. A more realistic figure, the sources conclude, is between 100,000 and 110,000 combatants out of the Army's 302,000 troops in Viet Nam, plus 68,000 of the 79,000 Marines.

By Pentagon reckoning, 37% of the troops assigned to the air and ground war are thus available for combat--far more than some officers in Saigon estimate. The figure is substantially lower than the World War II and Korea rate of 57%, but that is mainly due to the fact that thousands of construction troops were there to develop ports and airfields in the primitive country.

Bum Rap. On his return, McNamara gave the President a generally optimistic report on the war. Claims that the war was stalemated were "ridiculous," he said. On the pressing question of manpower, he said that requirements could be met without increasing draft calls or extending the one-year tours of duty for men assigned to Viet Nam. "I think some more U.S. military personnel will be required," he said. "I am not sure how many. I am certain of one thing: that we must use more effectively the personnel that are presently there."

When word of McNamara's statement reached Westmoreland, the general was hopping mad. Having returned to the U.S. to attend the funeral of his 81-year-old mother in Columbia, S.C., he flew up to Washington to confer with the Joint Chiefs at the Pentagon. He was barely able to conceal his anger over the suggestion that U.S. forces were not being used at full efficiency. It seemed he was taking a bum rap so the President and McNamara could hold down the budget deficit and avert a bigger tax increase.

Yes, Yes, Yes. It was the first time since Westmoreland was dispatched to Viet Nam more than three years ago that he has come anywhere near public disagreement with his civilian bosses. Concerned, the President called him to the White House for a harmony session. With McNamara present, he assured Westmoreland of his continued esteem and told him he would send as many troops as was feasible.

When the private parley was over, the President summoned newsmen to the handsome second-floor sitting room of the White House for the first news conference ever held there. On a couch before one of the gracefully arched windows sat General Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Westmoreland and McNamara. On a plush easy chair alongside the couch sat the President. When the audience of reporters was assembled, there ensued an extraordinary tableau. Whether or not it figures in future histories of Southeast Asia, it should certainly merit a mention in some Harvard Business School study of executive technique.

"The troops that General Westmoreland needs and requests," the President said, "will be supplied. General Westmoreland feels that is acceptable, General Wheeler thinks that is acceptable, and Secretary McNamara thinks that is acceptable. Is that not true, General Westmoreland?"

"I agree, Mr. President," Westmoreland replied.

"General Wheeler?" the President asked.

"That is correct, Mr. President," said Wheeler.

"Secretary McNamara?" "Yes, sir."

Said Westmoreland when he returned to the Pentagon: "I got everything I want."

Different Tack. Amid all the talk of increased troop levels, eight liberal Republicans in the House suggested a different tack altogether--mutual de-escalation by the U.S. and North Viet Nam in a move to get peace talks started. Headed by Massachusetts Congressman F. Bradford Morse, the group urged the U.S. to initiate a 60-day bombing suspension north of the 21st parallel, just below Hanoi. If North Viet Nam responded by closing off infiltration routes, U.S. bombers would gradually broaden the proscribed areas until the Northern raids had stopped entirely. Negotiations might then begin after each side had demonstrated a willingness to take limited steps toward peace.

Michigan's Republican Governor George Romney, who has been murky in most of his previous statements on Viet Nam, also called for new restrictions on the bombing. The raids against the North, he said, should "concentrate on targets in the northern portion of that country directly related to the infiltration of men and supplies into South Viet Nam." The bombings, he contended, have failed to achieve their "intended results."

U.S. officers in Saigon would dispute that. Air Force men credit the raids with destroying about 85% of the North's power-generating capacity, 30% of its rail system, half of its air force, 3,000 trucks, 4,000 watercraft and one-fifth of all men and materiel headed for infiltration into the South. McNamara further claims that 400,000 to 500,000 North Vietnamese have had to be diverted to repair bomb damage.

Despite the fresh appeals for a scale-down of the bombing, Lyndon Johnson is not expected to de-escalate unless Hanoi shows some disposition to ease off its war effort. Said the President: "We are very sure that we are on the right track."

* 465,000 Americans, 700,000 Vietnamese, 45,000 Koreans, 6,500 Australians, 2,500 Thais, 2,200 Filipinos, 200 New Zealanders.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.