Deaf Ear to the Military

Some of the most stringent criticism yet leveled at the President's management of the war came last week from the Stennis Committee, which rushed into print a 20-page report on its three-week inquiry into the course and conduct of the U.S. air offensive against North Viet Nam.

Charging that the Administration has consistently turned a deaf ear to the concerted advice of its military leaders, the Senate subcommittee said that as a result the U.S. has failed to mount "a systematic, timely and hard-hitting, integrated air campaign against the vital North Viet Nam targets. This policy has not done the job and has been contrary to the best military judgment."

Opposite Findings. The committee concentrated its attack on Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, who had insisted during his testimony before the Senators that heavier air attacks in the North could not significantly reduce U.S. casualties in South Viet Nam. McNamara also strongly implied that nearly all of 51 targets recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but so far not approved by the President, were barely worth attacking, including the major port of Haiphong.

The committee's findings were exactly the opposite and embodied the opinions of such military men as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle Wheeler, Air Force Chief of Staff General John McConnell, Pacific Commander Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp and Marine Commandant Wallace Greene. The report concluded that many lucrative targets in the North had yet to be attacked and argued that more U.S. lives would be spared if the bombing could be expanded. All military witnesses before the committee, said the report, "felt that this measure would have a substantial impact on the course of the war and the American and Allied casualties in the South."

Clarion Notice. "We are of the opinion," the Senators said, "that we cannot in good conscience ask our ground forces to continue their fight in South Viet Nam unless we are prepared to press the air war in the North in the most effective way possible. What is needed now is to take the risks that have to be taken and apply the force that is required to see the job through."

It is the "risks," of course, on which the whole argument hinges. Though the air war might have accomplished more with less restraint, the President's cautious, controlled targeting system has served as a clarion notice to the world that the U.S. has no intention of provoking a wider war. Even so, the bombing campaign, as the committee notes, is "a highly important, integral and truly indispensable part of the overall strategy" of the Viet Nam war. On that point, at least, the Stennis Committee and the Johnson Administration are in complete agreement.

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