Bedtime Thoughts

In 178 years, the balance between the President and the Congress has shifted not once but several times. During some periods--the entire generation after the Civil War, for example--the legislative branch has overshadowed the executive; at other times, particularly during a war, the White House has been predominant. Most of the 20th century has seen the President in the ascendancy. Last week the Senate Foreign Relations Committee attempted to redress the balance somewhat, approving unanimously a report calling for a congressional curb on the President's power to commit the country to foreign military ventures. Quoting authorities ranging from Supreme Court Justice (1932-38) Benjamin Cardozo to Napoleon Bonaparte, William Fulbright's committee condemned what it called "the dangerous tendency" toward presidential supremacy in foreign policy from Theodore Roosevelt right up to Lyndon Johnson. "Only in the present century," it said, "have Presidents used the armed forces of the U.S. against foreign governments entirely on their own authority, and only since 1950 have Presidents regarded themselves as having authority to commit the armed forces to full-scale and sustained warfare." The result of the "erosion" of Congress's control over war and peace, it went on, is that the President "now exercises something approaching absolute power over the life or death of every living American--to say nothing of millions of other people all over the world." Until limits are placed on the Chief Executive's powers, the committee warned, "the American people will be threatened with tyranny or disaster." At the very least, it said, Congress should pause and consider before it approves anything like the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1964, which Johnson used as a mandate for the subsequent Viet Nam buildup. The resolution, sponsored at the time by Fulbright himself, expressed congressional "approval and support" of the President's determination "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the U.S. and to prevent further aggression."

Taken literally, the committee's report probably would mean chaos for American foreign policy. Taken as a starting point for debate--and Fulbright has said that he has no immediate intention of putting the matter before the full Senate--it might be the signal for a healthy airing of differences between two of the major branches of U.S. Government. It can hardly help figuring to some extent in the 1968 campaign. Since it is merely an indication of sentiment, it is unlikely to cause Johnson any sleepless nights. Its strong language and bipartisan support might, however, induce some thought as he turns out the lights.

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