Future Indicative

Administration officials, long convinced that there is no realistic hope of peace negotiations until after the 1968 elections--if then--were admitting last week that they may have been too pessimistic. Their hopes, admittedly, were pinned on a nuance, but nuances are the language of diplomacy. The nuance in this case was conscious and coordinated: it was a simple change of grammatical mood in a statement from Hanoi. No longer does the Red regime in Hanoi say talks "could" start if the U.S. stops bombing North Viet Nam; now it says talks "will" start.

The question that nagged Washington was whether the shift to future indicative did, in fact, signal a bona fide peace bid. Outside of North Viet Nam, no one could say for sure. Nonetheless, other simultaneous developments added to the sense, if not the substance, of the hope that there might be some movement in the diplomatic deadlock.

Rumors sprouted in several countries that the Communists were ready to talk. Then the possibility that the war might spill over into Cambodia seemed suddenly more remote with the decision by Prince Norodom Sihanouk to discuss documented U.S. charges that his country is being used as a sanctuary by Communist troops. President Johnson chose Old Asia Hand Chester Bowles, 66, U.S. Ambassador to India, for the mission. He will try to work out an accommodation with Sihanouk, an old acquaintance, that would guarantee Cambodia's borders. Though Sihanouk last week accepted eleven airplanes, including three MIG-17 jets, and several dozen heavy guns from Communist China, he was talking buoyantly about the possibility of resuming diplomatic relations with the U.S., broken since 1965.

Mongolian Message. Washington's reaction to the words from Hanoi and Pnompenh was serious and empirical. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, asked if Hanoi's change in tense represented a bid to talk, replied: "I don't know yet. But I wouldn't want to characterize this statement today as either a peace feeler or as purely a propaganda move. Let's find out what this statement means as well as what it says."

The Johnson Administration at first was not even certain that there was any statement to study. The initial report came from the Agence France-Presse correspondent in Hanoi. He quoted North Viet Nam Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh as saying to a visiting delegation of Mongolian Communists: "If the American Government really wants talks, it must first unconditionally cease bombing and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam."

Next Step. Five days later, as U.S. officials probed the back corridors of diplomacy for confirmation, a North Vietnamese diplomat in Paris confirmed that Hanoi's position had indeed changed. Summoning Paris-based Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. Correspondent Bernard Redmont to the North Vietnamese mission, the diplomat, according to the reporter, said that if the bombings stop, peace talks will begin; he made no mention of Hanoi's repeated demand that the bombing pause must be permanent. "The next step," he told Redmont, "is up to President Johnson."

Next day, however, Hanoi's Paris mission took the next step itself and issued a statement labeling Redmont's report a "pure invention." The only truth in it, said the statement, was that "conversations"--not peace talks--will take place if the bombings stop. Apparently, Hanoi's man in Paris had been carried away by his own rhetoric and had told Redmont more than his government thought prudent.

The mere reassertion that North Viet Nam's position had shifted, however slightly, sent hopes soaring. Inflating the optimistic mood were reports that Hanoi's diplomats had made approaches about mediation and sites for negotiations in Laos, Burma, Cambodia and Indonesia. On investigation, however, the reports turned out to be either false or misleading, and U.S. diplomats expressed doubt that Hanoi had undertaken any concerted peace-feeler effort beyond Trinh's statement.

Sense of Dej`a Vu. The fact was that many Americans last week felt a hopeless sense of dej`a vu in all the talk about talks. Too many times the euphoria of peace "offensives" and "feelers" has ended in frustration. One year ago, North Viet Nam created a similar flurry of speculation by announcing that talks "could" begin if the U.S. stopped bombing for good. Nothing came of that, primarily because the North insisted that the basis for a settlement must be Hanoi's four-point program, which includes the demand that the internal affairs of South Viet Nam be settled in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front. That clearly is unacceptable to both the U.S. and South Viet Nam. Yet Foreign Minister Trinh in his recent statement still insisted on the four points.

The suspicion that haunts Western analysts is that the North is cynically--and successfully--exploiting the world's desire for peace in order to create pressure for a long or even permanent bombing pause. The Vatican weekly L'Osservatore della Domenica last week printed its harshest criticism yet of U.S. bombing policy, calling it a "blind alley" that undermines the U.S. "moral and political" position. Leaders of West Germany's Social Democratic Party urged Washington to end the bombing. Several U.S. Congressmen also called for a bombing pause and immediate negotiations, including Senator Robert Kennedy. "It seems to me we lose nothing if we sit down to negotiate," he said in San Francisco. "If we can't stop the conflict, we can always go back to killing each other."

An Attempt to Embarrass. What the U.S. could lose by a bombing pause, military leaders point out, is the sustained, punishing impact of the daily harassment and destruction of the North's war machine. The University of London's P. J. Honey, an expert on North Viet Nam, believes the North is in dire need of just such a respite. Though no one is predicting the imminent collapse of Ho Chi Minh's regime, the North is obviously under severe strain. In the nearly three years since the bombings began, Honey says, there has been a marked erosion of morale among the North Vietnamese. "The people can see no letup as long as the bombing continues," he argues. "There are doubts about the prospects of defeating so great a power as the U.S. The bombing has brought this home. Some 500,000 North Vietnamese have been tied up rebuilding roads and bridges and keeping communications lines open. Another 200,000 are manning antiaircraft batteries, and a further 200,000 coolies are occupied in taking stuff to the South. This has created grave inroads into the manpower of the country. There is fear about sabotaging of plants and the spreading of defeatist rumors."

All the same, if Hanoi is serious about negotiations, says Honey, its contacts with Washington in various parts of the world are "good enough so as not to need to rely on what Outer Mongolians tell the A.F.P. This has the look to me of simply another attempt to embarrass the U.S. Government."

Driving a Wedge. Indeed, when North Viet Nam wants to sit down at the negotiating table, it can communicate its desire directly to the U.S. within a matter of hours from any number of world capitals. U.S. Ambassador to Burma Henry A. Byroade has been in frequent touch with North Vietnamese officials and could be reached at any time. So, too, could embassy personnel in Moscow, who also have had dealings with the North Vietnamese. Chester Bowles's visit to Pnompenh this week gives the North another opportunity for a high-level contact. If Hanoi does not want to confer directly with Washington, President Johnson has made it clear that he would favor informal talks between the N.L.F. and South Viet Nam. "The war can be stopped in a matter of days," Johnson has said--if talks start in earnest.

Washington would like to see Saigon probe the N.L.F. to ascertain whether there is any chance of driving a wedge between it and Hanoi--even though most high U.S. officials in Viet Nam believe that the North dominates the Viet Cong's political leadership. But South Vietnamese officials are so fear ful of a U.S. attempt to foist an N.L.F.-dominated coalition government on them that they have refused to consider any formal meetings. It is conceivable, suggested an observer, that the North is trying to drive its own wedge between Washington and Saigon.

Such fears could be easily overcome, of course, by a candid explanation of their intentions by the Communists. Lacking that, the U.S. seems to have little choice but to continue to question and requestion every move by Hanoi--and then to proceed as cautiously as it was doing last week.

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